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As on-demand labor platforms proliferate the independent contractor
business model, plaintiffs’ attorneys in the United States have filed dozens
of misclassification lawsuits to secure rights and protections for workers.
The conventional wisdom is that if these lawsuits are won, then they will
reverse the growth of insecure work. This Article challenges this widelyheld assumption. Using empirical research, I examine the trajectories and
legacies of three celebrated misclassification lawsuits from earlier moments
of transportation “gig work” in California: Tracy v. Yellow Cab
Cooperative, Friendly Cab v. NLRB, and Alexander v. FedEx. Against
many odds, plaintiff workers secured judicial recognition of employee status
in each of these cases. The untold, post-litigation stories, however, were
surprisingly grim: workers’ economic lives were no more secure—and in
some cases more precarious—then before the lawsuits. While I maintain that
such litigation plays an important deterrence role, this Article highlights the
significant limitations of misclassification litigation victories in effecting and
enforcing the rights of gig workers. Based on this data, I critique the (over)
reliance on the private enforcement of employee-status to fight precarity in
the on-demand gig economy and suggest lessons for future advocacy.

INTRODUCTION
For the past half-decade, how to address the economic insecurities
of on-demand workers in the “gig economy”1 has been a subject of
intense political, academic, and popular discussion.2 Largely in reaction

1.
I define the “gig economy” as the labor market characterized by workers
who are considered independent contractors and thus carved out of employment and
labor law protections. The focus of this article is on the low-skilled and low-paid end of
the gig economy, mostly constituted by workers engaged in on-demand service work
such as chauffeur driving, food and goods delivery, home cleaning, gardening, and
errand-running.
2.
Collective anxiety about “gig workers” has set in across government,
academic, and labor sectors. For example, in late 2015, the White House organized a
conference around worker precarity in the gig economy. The conference was attended
by President Barack Obama, who in his comments at the White House Summit on
Worker Voice, articulated a concern that in the “on-demand” economy hard work and
economic security are decoupled. He stated:
We’ve got folks who are getting a paycheck driving for Uber or Lyft;
people who are cleaning other people’s houses through Handy; offering
their skills on TaskRabbit. And so there’s flexibility and autonomy and
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to the phenomenal growth of Uber,3 billions of dollars of venture
capital have funneled into platform startups with independent contractor

opportunity for workers. . . . And all this is promising. But if the
combination of globalization and automation undermines the capacity of the
ordinary worker and the ordinary family to be able to support themselves, if
employers are able to use these factors to weaken workers’ voices and give
them a take-it-or-leave-it deal in which they don’t have a chance to ever
save for the kind of retirement they’re looking for, if we don’t refashion the
social contract so that workers are able to be rewarded properly for the
labor that they put in . . . then we’re going to have problems. . . . So we’ve
got to make sure that as we continue to move forward, both in this new “on
demand” economy and in the traditional economy as a whole, hard work
guarantees some security.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the White House Summit on
Worker Voice (Oct. 7, 2015), in Administration of Barack Obama, 2015 Remarks at
the White House Summit on Worker Voice, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1, 7 (Oct. 7,
2015). Two months later, the Department of Labor held a symposium on the “Future of
Work” that focused on “the broad migration of longer-term employment relations to
more attenuated, shorter-term work arrangements.” The Future of Work: Diving into
the Data, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. BLOG, FUTURE OF WORK (June 17, 2016),
https://blog.dol.gov/2016/06/17/the-future-of-work-diving-into-the-data
[https://perma.cc/4KJ7-BFRH]. While the Trump administration has since deleted the
internet footprint of findings from that symposium (perhaps signaling a less critical
stance toward the gig economy), a press release still remains on the Department of
Labor’s website that as of September 2016, the Department was issuing grants to nonprofits to “expand portable retirement benefits for low-wage workers.” US Labor
Department Announces More than $150K in Research Grants to Expand Portable
Retirement Savings Plans for Low-Wage Workers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS
RELEASE (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/wb/wb20160922
[https://perma.cc/TJ6A-UHW3]. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
2017–2021 Strategic Enforcement Plan, too, takes aim at the gig economy. U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Strategic Enforcement Plan Fiscal Year 2017–
2021. See EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE 1, 7–8,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/PK4S-PGXQ].
Of course, academic papers on the subject abound. A search of “employee status” and
“gig economy” on Google Scholar in September 2017 yielded no less than 149 hits.
GOOGLE
SCHOLAR:
SEARCH
RESULTS
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=%22employee+status%22+%26+%22
gig+economy%22&btnG=&as_sdt=1%2C50&as_sdtp
[https://perma.cc/3LCWHYEM]. I have contributed two articles to this growing body of scholarship: V.B.
Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker
Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 120–22 (2017) [hereinafter Dubal, Wage Slave or
Entrepreneur?]; V.B. Dubal, The Drive to Precarity: A Political History of Work,
Regulation, & Labor Advocacy in San Francisco's Taxi & Uber Economies, 38
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 73, 75–77 (2017) [hereinafter Dubal, The Drive to
Precarity]. The collective anxiety about the growth of the gig economy is not only
national but global; at a 2017 international labor law conference I attended, roughly
twenty-five paper presentations and one book talk were on worker precarity brought on
by the independent contractor status of workers in the gig economy.
3.
There are a number of ways to measure this growth. The most common
way is through the capitalization of Uber. As of February 2017, the company had taken
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business models conceived to disrupt, extend, or produce new service
economies.4 In 2013 and 2014, the annual growth rates of such labor
platforms ranged between 300 and 400 percent.5 Corresponding to this
growth is an increasing number of workers who have been “gigging”—
performing services or delivering goods on-demand and at the direction
of technology platforms, but without the safety and security of
employment benefits.6 These on-demand workers join existing service
workers not considered employees and thus ineligible for basic
safeguards like minimum wage, overtime, workers’ compensation,
unemployment insurance, freedom from discrimination at work, and the
right to collectively bargain.7 While much attention is given to the
insecurities faced by these tech-enabled gig workers,8 to date, almost no
legislation at the city, state, or federal level has passed to address their

over 12 billion dollars over fifteen rounds of investments. Jim Edwards, Uber’s Leaked
Finances Show the Company Might—Just Might—Be Able to Turn a Profit, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb. 27, 2017, 12:53 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-leakedfinances-accounts-revenues-profits-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/8PF4-6GSW]. Equally
impressive, however, is the participation rate of workers on the app. According to
Forbes in May, 2015, “Uber's active driver base has grown from basically zero in mid2012 to over 160,000 at the end of 2014. The number of new drivers has more than
doubled every six months for the last two years.” Brian Solomon, The Numbers Behind
Uber’s Exploding Driving Force, FORBES (May 1, 2015, 12:27 PM)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2015/05/01/the-numbers-behind-ubersexploding-driver-force/#1523e9475750 [https://perma.cc/8V8Y-P8X2].
4.
According to a 2017 estimate, more than 25 billion dollars in venture
capital has been invested in on-demand platforms. Sunil Rajaraman, The On-Demand
Economy is a Bubble—and it’s About to Burst, QUARTZ (Apr. 28, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/532Y-FUBL]. Of this, 16.56 billion dollars has been invested in
transportation and logistics platforms alone. Id. Most of these platforms use putative
independent contractor labor. Id.
5.
Ruth Berrins Collier, V.B. Dubal, & Christopher Carter, Labor Platforms
and Gig Work: The Failure to Regulate 2 (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp’t,
Working Paper No. 106–17, 2017), http://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2017/LaborPlatforms-and-Gig-Work.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U2C-SFNF] [hereinafter Labor
Platforms and Gig Work] (quoting Paychecks, Paydays, and the Online Platform
Economy: Big Data on Income Volatility, JP MORGAN CHASE INST. 1 (2016)
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/document/jpmc-institute-volatility2-report.pdf) [https://perma.cc/7UZG-C78U]).
6.
See, e.g., STEVEN HILL, RAW DEAL: HOW THE “UBER ECONOMY” AND
RUNAWAY CAPITALISM ARE SCREWING AMERICAN WORKERS 84–88, 108–09 (2015).
7.
Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-In-Time Workforce”: OnDemand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig-Economy”, 37 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 471–72, 479–80 (2016).
8.
Workers in my own research have complained most significantly of their
low, unpredictable wages. Other complaints include lack of benefits, unpaid wages,
ratings system, threat of termination, stringent rules and regulations, and an inability to
contact Uber service representatives. See, e.g., HILL supra note 6, at 88–89; De
Stefano, supra note 7, at 483.
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unprotected status as putative independent contractors.9 Instead, nearly
all efforts to address the unstable work lives of gig workers have been
through misclassification lawsuits filed to bring them under the
employee umbrella.10
One of the most important and internationally scrutinized examples
of such attempts is O’Connor v. Uber,11 a misclassification class action
filed against Uber in 2013. In addition to being the first lawsuit against
the tech giant to have a (large) class of drivers certified, O’Connor was
filed in northern California—a jurisdiction with both an expansive legal
definition of employee12 and potentially sympathetic judges and jurors.13
Conventional wisdom among analysts was that if O’Connor went to
trial and the class won, then Uber would be forced to—at the very
least—begin paying their California drivers like employees.14 This,
many predicted, would pressure Uber to re-think their contractor
business model, deter others from copying it, and impede the flow of
investment into the sector. Some commentators went so far as to
suggest the case might “kill the gig economy.”15

9.
Ruth Collier, V.B. Dubal, & Christopher Carter, Disrupting Regulation
and Regulating Disruption: The Politics of Uber in the United States 17 (May 23, 2017)
[hereinafter Disrupting Regulation] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
10.
See id. at 15.
11.
O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-03826-KAW, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120406, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013).
12.
The test for employee status under California state law is delineated in
S.G. Borrello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 406–07 (Cal.
1989).
13.
Although a large class of drivers was initially certified by the court, a
portion was de-certified after a Ninth Circuit decision overruling the district court
decision on the issue of arbitration. See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201,
1206 (9th Cir. 2016). According to a motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs’
attorney filed by Uber in August 2017, the plaintiffs’ attorney has solicited drivers from
the de-certified class to bring as many individual claims as possible to arbitration.
Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Sanctions at 4,
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016)(Doc. 811).
14.
See, e.g., Dianna Kapp, Uber’s Worst Nightmare, S. F. MAG., May 18,
2016, http://www.llrlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Uber%E2%80%99s-WorstNightmare.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCR5-A7TT].
15.
Therese Poletti, The Lawyer Looking to Kill the “Gig Economy”,
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 8, 2015, 9:04 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/thelawyer-looking-to-kill-thegig-economy-2015-12-07 [https://perma.cc/VPR8-KJ7M].
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Illustration 1: Two of my clients—Gladys Quinones (far left) and Edward Escobar (far
right)—joined fellow Uber drivers to object to the proposed settlement O’Connor.
Many of these drivers had been relying on the misclassification class action to change
their status to employees for wage purposes. Here, plaintiff objectors are outside the
courthouse holding signs reading “Reject the Settlement” and “I am an Employee.”16

In the course of my engaged research17 on regulatory responses to
the on-demand platform economy, I found that after a class was
certified in O’Connor, drivers,18 workers’ rights advocates, labor
leaders, and sympathetic policy makers across the nation put on pause

16.
Photo by Laura Waxmann, in Laura Waxmann, Uber Drivers Push Back
Against Proposed Settlement in Suit, MISSION LOC. (June 3, 2016, 12:41 PM),
https://missionlocal.org/2016/06/uber-drivers-push-back-against-proposed-settlementin-suit/ [https://perma.cc/H5WJ-2JVS].
17.
The impetus for this Article arose as I conducted engaged research for a
larger project on workers, worker organizing, and regulation in the tech-enabled gig
economy. This research included an ethnography of a group of Uber drivers working to
improve their conditions, surveys of Uber drivers, and interviews with worker
advocates, labor leaders, non-profit advocates, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and city and state
regulators. As I describe in the body of the Article, I was struck by how hopeful my
interlocutors were about the effectiveness of employee-status litigation to challenge
exploitative working conditions in the Uberized gig-economy.
18.
Hundreds of drivers officially objected to the proposed settlement in
O’Connor v. Uber. See Tracy Lien, Late Arrivals: Uber Drivers who Missed Filing
Deadline Are Still Bashing Proposed Lawsuit Settlement, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2016,
1:37
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-uber-objections20160527-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/PC85-P46A].
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attempts (through policy advocacy and organizing) to address the many
grievances of platform gig workers.19 Although I represented Uber
drivers in an official objection20 to the proposed O’Connor settlement,
urging the plaintiffs’ attorney to take the case to trial, I was—and
remain—skeptical as to whether a decision in this case would have a
long-term impact on worker security.
With these responses to O’Connor as a prompt, this Article probes
the impact of misclassification litigation on the fight against precarious
work.21 To assess the efficacy of these lawsuits, I examine three
successful cases from the antecedent gig economy: Tracy v. Yellow Cab
Coop.,22 Friendly Cab Co. v. NLRB, 23 and Alexander v. FedEx Ground
Package System, Inc.24 These cases challenged the independent
contractor status of taxi drivers (Tracy, Friendly Cab) and truck drivers
(Alexander). Against many odds, the plaintiffs in each case won,
establishing safety-net benefits (Tracy), secure wages (Alexander), and
collective bargaining rights (Friendly Cab) for gig workers.
These lawsuits share similarities with and bear lessons for today’s
on-demand platform workers. Like today’s gig workers, plaintiffs in
these cases labored in a grey zone with regard to their status as
workers. They exhibited the legal characteristics of traditional
employees: their work was a core part of the employer’s business; they
were forced to abide by stringent rules and regulations; and they had
limited entrepreneurial opportunity.25 But they also shared common
experiences with independent contractors, namely, they labored on
relatively flexible schedules and performed without the oversight of an
on-site supervisor. Though these workers operated in a grey legal zone,

19.
Gonzalez’s legislative aides told me that the reason they did not move
forward with the gig worker bill is because the labor community asked them to hold off
until O’Connor went to trial. The drivers who I study similarly were holding off on
their organization and affiliation with a union until the case was decided. Declaration of
Veena Dubal in Support of Objections to Class Settlement at 7–10, 17, O’Connor v.
Uber Tech. Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (Nos. 3:13-cv-03826-EMC).
20.
Id.
21.
For purposes here, I define precarious work as work that lacks stability
and the benefits of regulation. For a sample from the growing body of sociological
work on the precariat see Arne L. Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers:
Employment Relations in Transition, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 2 (2009); GUY STANDING,
THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS 7–13 (2011); ANDREW ROSS, NICE WORK
IF YOU CAN GET IT: LIFE AND LABOR IN PRECARIOUS TIMES 34–35 (2009).
22.
No. 938786, slip op. at 2 (Super. Ct. Cal. Feb. 10, 1997).
23.
512 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2008).
24.
765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014).
25.
For an in-depth examination of the doctrinal test for employee status see
my article Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?, supra note 2, at 72.
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a fact-intensive legal inquiry in each case led to an unlikely but positive
outcome for the plaintiffs: employee status.
In analyzing these lawsuits and their post-litigation effects, this
Article draws on a long history of critical legal scholarship examining
the role of litigation on social change.26 Taking on Michael McCann’s
call to “assess how . . . [legal] struggles affect . . . constituents and
their relations with the dominant groups over the long haul[,]”27 I
investigate the enduring impacts of these misclassification lawsuit
successes on the plaintiff workers.28 How have these legal victories
affected their lives? To answer this question, I employ qualitative
empirical methodologies including semi-structured interviews,
ethnography (in the taxi context), and archival research. I then draw
upon this data to make sense of the pre- and post-litigation realities of
worker plaintiffs in Tracy, Friendly Cab, and Alexander.29 In each case
study, the findings were counterintuitively grim: the evasion of
workers’ rights persisted and workers continued to labor without
protections. These misclassification lawsuits undoubtedly played and
26.
See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM 23–24 (1978); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 9–10 (2d ed. 2008); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE
POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 49–53 (2d ed.
2004); Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement Strategy,
96 IOWA L. REV. 61 (2011); Scott L Cummings & Ingrid V Eagly, A Critical Reflection
on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. (2001); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves”
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
95, 137–39 (1974); Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s
“Allurements”: A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States,
in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
261, 261– 92 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
27.
Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social Movements?, in
HOW DOES LAW MATTER? (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998).
28
Id. at 97.
29.
In addition to the interviews and examination of municipal and legal
records, both the taxi worker cases studied in this paper are informed by both my
practice as a public interest lawyer representing taxi workers (between 2008–2010) and
by over two years of ethnographic research in the San Francisco taxi industry (between
2010–2013). My observations on the contemporary on-demand platform gig economy
includes one year of ethnographic and interview-based research amongst San Francisco
Bay Area Uber drivers. This ethnographic and qualitative research of Uber drivers in
the Bay Area is ongoing but began substantively in 2015. This research includes
hundreds of hours of observation of Uber drivers in organizing meetings, fifteen indepth interviews of Uber drivers, over 250 Uber driver surveys, and extensive review
of legal complaints against Uber and regulatory debates and decisions regarding Uber
and Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) across U.S. cities and states. Much of
the regulatory research was conducted as part of a larger project investigating the
politics of Uber regulation; this project is being conducted with Professor Ruth Berins
Collier and Christopher Carter, Department of Political Science, University of
California, Berkeley.
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continue to play an important deterrence role,30 both drawing public
attention to these practices and dissuading some firms from embracing
the independent contractor business model. But this research highlights
the significant limitations of such litigation in effecting and enforcing
stability and security for gig workers.
Two important lessons arise from these findings. The first lesson is
that the relative structural and political power of firms makes enforcing
employee status in the gig economy a difficult, if not impossible, feat.
In each of these case studies, employers escaped compliance without
additional legal penalty. In Tracy, San Francisco taxi companies
successfully deterred workers from enforcing their rights through
threatened worker blacklists. In Friendly Cab, despite six years of
litigation and a federal appellate court ruling, the Oakland taxicab
company leveraged their substantial political clout and access to a
fungible workforce to undermine the advocacy of worker leaders and to
refuse to bargain with the union. Perhaps most ominously, in
Alexander, FedEx used the Ninth Circuit’s decision as a roadmap,
drawing on their legal and business acumen to alter their business
model so that workers looked even less like employees under the
established case law. These lessons on the structural and political power
of capital to evade enforcement of employee status also illustrate how
dependence on misclassification litigation in the gig economy may
exacerbate worker precarity. In the aftermath of Friendly Cab, for
example, immigrant taxi workers were pushed out of the industry and
struggled without other employment options. FedEx truck drivers, too,
suffered as the company re-wrote their contracts, resulting in job loss
for some and increased risk and responsibility for others.
The second lesson that I draw from these case studies is that
litigating for employee status may obscure worker plaintiffs’ broader
goals—especially in the gig economy. Surprisingly, plaintiff workers
who whole-heartedly endorsed and participated in these lawsuits did not
necessarily want to be employees. In Friendly Cab, the pursuit of
employment status for unionizing purposes led workers astray from
their original goal: self-ownership. And in Alexander, what plaintiff
workers wanted from the beginning was to be treated like true
30.
The deterrence role should not be diminished. For example, the Munchery
CEO admitted that he chose to use employee drivers because he did not want to face
misclassification litigation. See Caroline O’Donovan, What Happens When a Delivery
Startup Tries to Pay Its Workers Well?, BUZZFEED (Apr. 14, 2015, 5:00 PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/can-mun?utm_term=.xjjl0vroZ#.dhq3oK
BEp [https://perma.cc/CB72-ZA4Y]. “Prime Now” drivers, who drive for a company
Amazon contracts in the Bay Area, were converted from independent contractors to
employees overnight by the threat of a misclassification lawsuit. Interview with Beth
Ross, Partner, Leonard Carder, LLP, in Berkeley, Cal. (Feb. 26, 2016).
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independent contractors, with the independence and entrepreneurial
opportunity of small businesses.
Though these lessons challenge the efficacy of employee rights
enforcement in the gig economy, the findings in this Article are not
intended to be a critique of rights more broadly.31 In many cases and
contexts, the enforcement of employee rights has been effective and
important. But for reasons elaborated in Part III, misclassification
litigation—even under the best of circumstances—is not well-suited as a
solo strategy for workers in the gig economy. In making this argument,
I draw on the seminal work of Scott Cummings and Deborah Rhodes
who observed, “that litigation, although a necessary strategy of social
change, is never sufficient; it cannot effectively work in isolation from
other mobilization efforts.”32 I emphasize that standalone litigation wins
are ineffective for gig workers not just because of a lack of effective
judicial enforcement power.33 They are also ineffective because
employee status for workers in a “grey zone” cannot address their vast
structural and political inequality with firms. To fight precarity enacted
by the gig economy, misclassification litigation must be leveraged
alongside other forms of political and legal activism that are attendant
to worker self-visions and that build and nurture collective worker
power.
Before analyzing the case studies and deducing these lessons, the
next section, Part I, situates contemporary gig work in the recent
history of precarious work, connecting current patterns in the ondemand labor platform economy with older models of contingent labor
and making a case for why lessons from these antecedent lawsuits are
important today. In this section, I also describe the existing responses
to the production of precarious work by on-demand labor platforms—
noting the absence of organizing and legislative attempts and stressing
an over-reliance on the enforcement of employee status through
litigation. Part II uses empirical research to understand the trajectory of
each case study, Tracy, Friendly Cab, and Alexander, and to assess
their long-term impacts on worker plaintiffs. In Part III, I expand upon
the lessons discussed above. I argue that the structural and political
power of firms to evade enforcement and worker ambivalence towards
employee status constrained the impacts of detached misclassification.
Finally, in the Conclusion, I suggest possible advocacy paths forward.

31.
Stuart Scheingold famously coined the term “the Myth of Rights” to
describe how litigation diverts attention from the political roots of inequality.
SCHEINGOLD, supra note 26, at 1–10.
32.
Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation:
Insights from Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 605 (2009).
33.
Id. at 607–08.
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CONTEXTUALIZING CONTEMPORARY GIG WORK

A central contention of this paper is that older patterns of gig work
hold lessons for and are connected to the newer patterns much
discussed today. Accordingly, this section situates the current model of
platform-enabled independent contracting within the longer history of
the “fissured workplace.”34 I discuss how and why independent
contractor business models which were once localized in certain
industries—like transportation—are now proliferating in the service
industry via technology platforms. I then examine existing political and
legal responses to the proliferation of platform-enabled independent
contracting. Half a decade has passed since Uber—literally—hit the
streets in San Francisco. Though celebrated by some scholars35 and
commentators for the freedom and flexibility the work offers, one does
not have to scratch far beneath the surface to discover the brutality of
much of the platform-enabled work that followed. Since roughly 2013,
increasing attention has been paid to the exploitation of on-demand
platform workers who face such issues of wage theft, over-work, and
even psychological manipulation.36 Below, I review the recent
responses to this much-discussed precarity.
A. New Industry Disruption or Old Worker Exploitation?
Despite excitement about the rise of on-demand labor platforms as
new and disruptive, many companies in the platform-enabled gig
economy (popularly referred to as the “sharing economy”) build upon
and intensify older patterns of capital shifts and re-organization. These
patterns of change—beginning almost forty years ago—were enacted in
large part to minimize corporate costs and change how capital gains
were shared.37 Scholars have argued that these changes contributed to
34.
35.

See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014).
See, e.g., ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF
EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM (2016).
36
See, e.g., Labor Platforms and Gig Work, supra note 5, at 14–15. See
also Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
2,
2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-driverspsychological-tricks.html [https://perma.cc/5KRY-YTFD] (discussing Uber’s use of
behavioral science techniques to make their drivers behave in a way that increases the
company’s profits); Noam Scheiber, Uber to Repay Millions to Drivers, Who Could be
Owed
Far
More,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
23,
2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/economy/uber-drivers-tax.html
[https://perma.cc/4TFF-4A2Q] (discussing tens of millions of dollars that Uber owes its
drivers due to a “mistake” in the way the company calculated commissions).
37.
WEIL, supra note 34, at 11.
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the contemporary and growing dualization of the labor market—with
low wages at the bottom and high gains at the top.38 In this section, I do
not do justice to the full economic and sociologic literature explaining
these patterns, but attempt to highlight some key and relevant
observations. How did we get here?
In the mid-1970s, alongside globalization and the rise of finance,39
U.S. firms commenced both internal and external restructurings that
continue today. Some corporations developed practices of “internal
flexibility” and forms of organization founded on employee initiative.40
This cultural and ideological shift pushed the individual
responsibilization of work for both individual and collective security.41
Many companies also initiated the process of externalizing risks and
responsibilities not related to their core competencies.42 This latter
change, motivated in part to “disembed capital”43 from the
redistributive responsibilities cast upon business by the New Deal and
post-New Deal order, is what economist David Weil calls the “fissuring
of work.” Both practices are evident in the extreme in today’s platformenabled gig economy. On the one hand, workers are encouraged to act
entrepreneurially and through self-initiative to make money for
themselves and the firm. On the other hand, many of these firms claim
that software is their core competency, and thus workers performing

38.
Ruth Berins Collier, V.B. Dubal, & Christopher Carter, The Regulations
of Labor Platforms: The Politics of the Uber Economy, BERKELEY ROUNDTABLE INT’L
ECON. 1, 3 (2017) [hereinafter The Regulations of Labor Platforms].
39.
SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: ESSAYS ON THE
NEW MOBILITY OF PEOPLE AND MONEY 140 (1999).
40.
LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 80–81
(Gregory Elliott trans., 2005).
41.
Between the 1930s and 1960s, the culture of large, industrial firms was on
the “socialization of production, distribution and consumption, and collaboration
between large firms and the state in pursuit of social justice.” Id. at 18. Firms
employed Taylor-ist techniques of organization, and largely in response to pressure
from the labor movement, they accepted their social and economic responsibility to
workers, whose lives, because workers were understood also as consumers, were
inextricably tied to that of the firm. Id. at 80–81. By the 1970s, this integration of
workers into the social order began to wane. Instead of a firm culture that “yoked
economic and technological progress to the aim of social justice,” firm culture shifted
to “a project of [worker] self-realization, linking the cult of individual performance and
extolment of mobility to the reticular conceptions of the social bond.” Id. at 217. This
change is reflected by shifts in techniques of work, including the rise of expectations of
multitasking and emphasis placed on “self-control and the development of autonomy.”
Id. at 218. For an examination of how the entrepreneur became legally exalted in this
process see Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?, supra note 2, at 101, 116–131.
42.
See WEIL, supra note 34, at 8.
43.
DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 11 (2005).
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tasks and services through the software have been “externalized” as
independent contractors.
Weil describes the fissuring of work as a “seismic shift” from
earlier parts of the twentieth century.44 Most large tech firms today
operating at the top of their industries—from Apple to Uber—“no
longer directly employ legions of workers to make products or deliver
services.”45 Instead, employment—and the relationship between
employers and their employees—has been casualized. While many
companies focus on their core competencies, they shed in-house service
workers, placing responsibilities for gardening, janitorial services,
accounting, and other provisions of service to other employers.46 This
makes social and legal accountability for worker safety and security
murky and difficult to enforce.
In addition to these outsourced relationships, a number of studies,
including my own, have shown a rise in the vulnerability of
“contingent” workers. Some contingent workers labor as precarious
employees—as members of the “disposable, part-time and temporary”47
labor force. These include just-in-time workers and temporary workers,
who, while considered employees, do not benefit from many of the
securities associated with full-time employment. Other contingent
workers—including taxi drivers, truck drivers, nail salon workers,
home care workers, and construction workers—labor as putative
independent contractors. This casual or contingent sector of the work
force has grown dramatically since the late 1970s. Contingent work
grew seventy-five percent faster than the overall workforce from 1980
to 1993, and by 1995, these “casual” workers constituted about onethird of the workforce.48
Most important to the analysis here is not just the reflection of
these larger trends, but also that independent contracting is not new and
did not originate with the platform-enabled gig economy. Independent
contracting in the taxi industry, for example, began as early as the

44.
WEIL, supra note 34, at 8.
45.
Id.
46.
These lead businesses in turn create “downward pressure on the marginal
price” for the outsourced services. Id. at 15. Businesses competing for contracts for the
outsourced service work face significant pressures to lower their own prices, which in
turn impacts the more fungible workers that they employ. This pressure and
subcontracting to a complicated network of smaller business units has itself contributed
to a larger trend away from full-time regulated employment to “casual” employment.
Id. This is true even on the higher end of the service industry.
47.
Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure,
Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 557, 558 (1996).
48.
WEIL, supra note 34, at 272.
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1950s and took off in the 1970s.49 Taxi companies went from paying
their drivers a wage to leasing their vehicles to workers—demanding
that drivers pay to work. Due to municipal regulations in the taxi
industry, while this form of work was necessarily precarious, some
semblance of security over wages and hours remained.50 In other
industries, like truck driving and delivery services, companies like
FedEx not only leveraged independent contractor labor as early as the
1990s, but also effectively pushed for the deregulation of competition,
making it easier to grow their companies but harder to regulate worker
security. Thus, as I and my colleagues have discussed elsewhere, “with
respect to employment trends, the [labor] platform economy is not so
‘disruptive.’”51 Rather, on-demand platform companies build upon and
exacerbate the prevalence of the fissured workplace: using independent
contractor labor and pushing for (and frequently achieving) broader
industry deregulation.
What is disruptive about the platform economy is the rate at which
technology and venture capital together have spurred the growth of
precarious unregulated independent contractor work. While the number
of contingent workers remained steady for much of the early 2000s, it
has since taken off, corresponding both to the timing of the Great
Recession (and the loss of full-time jobs) and the rise of the on-demand
labor platforms.52
In some ways, the new on-demand labor platforms reflect the
business models and strategies of taxi companies and FedEx put
together, making the case studies in this Article even more relevant.
These new gig firms combine the on-demand service models of taxi
companies whose workers are paid in piece-rate with FedEx’s strategy
of forced deregulation and requirement of worker capital investment.
This latter point is key. While taxi companies continued to bear
financial responsibility for the upkeep of vehicles, the dispatch
technology, and the commercial insurance to cover potentially injured
parties, many on-demand labor platform companies claim they are
merely technology businesses that cyber coordinate service
transactions. They thus push all associated costs and risks of business
onto workers—including those liabilities related to the companies’ core
competencies.53

49.
Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?, supra note 2, at 96–97.
50.
See Dubal, The Drive to Precarity, supra note 2, at 116–18.
51.
The Regulations of Labor Platforms, supra note 38, at 4.
52.
Labor Platforms and Gig Work, supra note 5, at 4.
53.
Uber and Lyft, for example, require their drivers to purchase (or lease)
vehicles, pay for commercial or hybrid personal-commercial insurance, pay for their
phones, pay for all the associated car upkeep costs, and pay for gas. See, e.g., Jennie
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B. Existing Responses to Tech-Enabled Gig Work
The fact that contemporary on-demand platform labor continues
and intensifies older models of precarious work makes the case studies
herein particularly important. But the additional impetus and perceived
need for this Article arises from my and my colleagues’ research on the
regulatory responses in both political and legal spheres to the labor
conditions proliferated by such companies.54
Over the last half-decade, Uber and similar tech-enabled gig
companies have taken center stage in public debates about the growth of
precarious work. As mentioned above, journalists, academics, and
policy makers across the political spectrum have spent immense
amounts of time discussing and strategizing about what some have
called a “new world of work” in which companies claim they are not
employers and workers are excluded from the protections accorded
most employees over the last century. Global conferences proliferate on
the matter, with hundreds of thousands of dollars of foundation and
university money being spent on “thinking” about what to do in
response. And yet, almost no state action has been taken on the
matter—either by legislatures or agencies assigned to address labor
issues.55 Instead, almost all efforts to protect gig workers have been
Davis, Drive at Your Own Risk: Uber Violates Unfair Competition Laws by Misleading
UberX Drivers About Their Insurance Coverage, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1097, 1101–02
(2015) (“Ride-sharing is a transportation service whereby people without commercial
licenses use their own personal vehicles to provide rides to strangers for a fee.”); Avi
Asher-Schapiro, Is Uber's Business Model Screwing Its Workers?, MOYERS & CO.
(Oct. 1, 2014), http://billmoyers.com/2014/10/01/ubers-business-model-screwingworkers/ [http://perma.cc/NC8W-M7U8] (“Uber drivers have no say in the pricing,
yet they must carry their own insurance and foot the bill for gas and repairs—a cost of
56¢ per mile, according to IRS estimates.”). In addition, drivers must also do
managerial tasks and the unpaid work of making sure they are paid correctly,
calculating and paying their taxes, and figuring out how best to work to optimize
earnings. See, e.g., Alison Griswold, Uber Drivers are Comparing Fares with Riders to
Check Their Pay From the Company, QUARTZ (Apr. 13, 2017)
https://qz.com/956139/uber-drivers-are-comparing-fares-with-riders-to-check-their-payfrom-the-company/ [https://perma.cc/8JDB-Z9B5] (“Independent Drivers Guild . . .
encouraged drivers to compare their fare with their passenger’s in Uber and other ridehailing services.”); Tax Tips for Uber, Lyft, Sidecar, and other Car Sharing Drivers,
TURBOTAX
(2016)
https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tools/tax-tips/Self-EmploymentTaxes/Tax-Tips-for-Uber--Lyft--Sidecar-and-other-Car-Sharing-Drivers/INF28820.html
[https://perma.cc/ZYQ6-SW3J] (Explaining, “So when you receive a payment,
understand that it's not a traditional ‘paycheck,’ and likely no taxes have been taken
out. It's up to you to take care of federal and state income taxes, as well as Social
Security and Medicare.”).
54.
For some of these findings see Labor Platforms and Gig Work, supra note
5, at 19–20.
55.
The Regulation of Labor Platforms, supra note 38, at 2.
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made via private enforcement mechanisms, either by individuals in
administrative contexts or—most commonly—by plaintiffs’ attorneys in
class actions.56
Counterintuitively, most legislative efforts on matters of gig work
since 2012 have enforced the status of gig workers as independent
contractors carved out of employment and labor laws.57 For example,
despite widespread allegations of inadequate income and dangerous
conditions for workers in the on-demand platform economy, the
Florida,58 North Carolina,59 Arkansas,60 and Indiana61 state legislatures
have all passed laws codifying the position of on-demand transportation
platform companies that their drivers are independent contractors.62
In contrast, no state legislatures have passed laws to either enforce
existing employee rights for gig workers or to create new rights for
them.63 An attempt was made in 2016, by California Assemblywoman
Lorena Gonzalez, who almost introduced a bill that would have given
all independent contractors in the state the right to collectively
56.
Id. at 30–35.
57.
Id. at 21.
58.
Gig Economy Game-Changer? New Florida Law Ensures Contractor
Status for Drivers, FISHER PHILLIPS; LEGAL ALERTS (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://www.fisherphillips.com/pp/alert-new-florida-law-ensures-contractor-status-fordrivers.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7HJ-5A35].
59.
Heather Sommerville & Dan Levine, Exclusive: U.S. States Pass Laws
Backing Uber’s View of Drivers as Contractors, REUTERS, (Dec. 10, 2015, 1:23 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-statelaws/exclusive-u-s-states-pass-lawsbacking-ubers-view-of-drivers-as-contractors-idUSKBN0TT2MZ20151210
[https://perma.cc/3Y2Q-MX8P]. North Carolina is particularly interesting because of
their simultaneous work to fight independent contracting in the construction industry.
Andrew M. Ballard, North Carolina Tackles Employee Misclassification, 31 LABOR
RELATIONS
WEEK
950
http://news.bna.com/lrln/LRLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=119003899&vname=lrw
notallissues&jd=0000015de173d5b8a7dff97fecaa0002&split=0
[https://perma.cc/86YD-4RDE].
60.
Sommerville & Levine, supra note 59.
61.
Id.
62.
After the Alaska labor commissioner fined Uber in 2015 for violation of
workers’ compensation laws, the company left the state, only to return two years later
when the legislature specifically codified a workers’ compensation exemption for the
companies. Annie Zak, Uber Plans to Resume Ride-Hailing Operations in Alaska in
June, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (May 25, 2017), https://www.adn.com/businesseconomy/2017/05/25/uber-plans-to-return-to-alaska-in-june/ [https://perma.cc/5D3H68SW]; see also ALASKA STAT. § 21.96.018 (2016). While these policy makers may
have been heavily lobbied by platform companies, my discussions with such decisionmakers suggest that they are also motivated by an anxiety about driving away
innovation and jobs. The sense is that the friendlier legislatures are to tech companies,
the more likely those companies will invest in the state’s economy—spurring what
many imagine as the next generation of tech-fueled “industrial growth.”
63.
The Regulation of Labor Platforms, supra note 38, at 35.
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organize. The bill, however, was stymied both by the proposed
settlement in O’Connor, which was to produce an Uber-funded “worker
association,” and by the state’s labor community which was divided
over the strategy.64 Many believed that the bill “gave-in” to the
independent contractor business model and that energy should instead
be spent forcing companies to comply with existing collective
bargaining laws.65 As Gonzalez’s legislative aide told me after the bill
was pulled (perhaps not coincidentally on the same day that the
proposed settlement in O’Connor was announced), “Everyone in [the]
labor [community] kept saying, ‘Let’s see what happens with this
misclassification case [O’Connor], maybe they will [be found to] be
employees’ . . . that was their push back before. What are they going
to say now?”66
The Teamsters Joint Council 7 Political Director, Doug Bloch,
said the same, “When [Gonzalez’s] bill was drafted, we thought maybe
it wasn’t needed because of the [O’Connor] class action.”67 While
Assemblywomen Gonzalez vowed to propose a similar bill the
following year in 2017, what she introduced was instead much weaker:
a measure mandating an in-app tipping option for on-demand platform
companies.68 This bill, too, was later pulled.
Even elected bodies in progressive cities, which are often places of
innovative political regulation in support of workers’ rights, have been
largely silent on issues faced by gig workers. Only two cities across the
nation (Seattle and New York City) have passed ordinances to address
the precarities posed by completely unregulated, low-income work.
Seattle—which is much discussed—is the lone municipality that passed
legislation specifically targeting the insecurities of on-demand
transportation workers (namely Uber, Lyft, and taxi drivers), granting
64.
Kate Conger, California Bill to Give Gig Workers Organizing Rights Stalls
over
Antitrust
Concerns,
TECHCRUNCH
(Apr.
21,
2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/21/california-bill-to-give-gig-workers-organizingrights-stalls-over-antitrust-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/V4XV-XQK2].
65.
See supra note 29.
66.
Telephone Interview with Laurel Brodzinsky, Legislative Aid, Office of
Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez (Apr. 22, 2016).
67.
Interview with Douglas Bloch, Political Dir., Teamsters Joint Council 7,
in Oakland, Cal. (May 3, 2016).
68.
Liam Dillon, Uber Would Have to Allow Drivers to Collect Tips from
Credit Cards Under a New California Bill, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017, 5:07 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-uber-willhave-to-accept-tips-from-1487379477-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/48TR-633Q].
This was later pulled when Uber voluntarily included this function in their app. See
Assemblywoman Applauds Uber Move to Allow In-App Tipping for Drivers, EAST
COUNTY TODAY (June 21, 2017), http://eastcountytoday.net/assemblywoman-applaudsuber-move-to-allow-in-app-tipping-for-drivers/ [https://perma.cc/E9RW-W77F].
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them the right to collectively bargain.69 New York City also passed a
bill focused on addressing wage theft experienced by freelancing
workers. The city council codified existing contract laws and gave
freelancers a more accessible form of recourse.70 This measure,
however, likely has little impact on-demand platform workers whose
payment is largely electronic and automated. Elected venues in cities
like San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Austin, which are known for
worker-friendly initiatives including minimum wage ordinances and
locally-funded health insurance for workers, have been surprisingly
silent on gig worker issues. Thus, despite collective anxiety about the
impact of technology on the future of work, almost nothing has passed
to address the grievances of workers.
State agencies tasked with addressing labor issues have also been
reticent to publicly respond to the issues raised by tech-enabled gig
work. The federal Department of Labor initiated a grant-giving process
to encourage non-governmental organizations to “think” about portable
benefits for such workers.71 Though the Alaska Workers’ Compensation
Board found Uber to be in violation of the state’s laws and fined them
accordingly, the state legislature went on to specifically exempt ondemand transportation companies from these laws in order to lure the
companies back to the state.72 The National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) has been relatively more active than other agencies, but even
their efforts have been stymied by the legal objections and the footdragging of tech firms. The NLRB Regional Office in San Francisco
initiated an investigation in early 2016 as to whether Uber drivers have
been misclassified as independent contractors under the National Labor
Relations Act.73 But this process has been slowed by Uber’s tenacious

69.
The Regulation of Labor Platforms, supra note 38, at 23–24
70.
Freelancers Aren’t Free: Mayor Announces First in Nation Protections for
Freelance Workers, CITY OF NEW YORK: OFFICE OF THE MAYOR (May 15, 2017),
http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/307-17/freelancers-aren-t-free-mayorfirst-nation-protections-freelance-workers [https://perma.cc/7DYZ-RVHK].
71.
US Labor Department Announces More Than $150K in Research Grants
to Expand Portable Retirement Savings Plans for Low-Wage Workers, U.S. DEP’T OF
LAB.,
NEWS
RELEASE
(Sept.
22,
2016),
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/wb/wb20160922
[https://perma.cc/9WY8BFFV].
72.
Elwood Brehmer, Uber Gets a Lift from Senate Authorization, ALASKA J.
COM. (Mar. 29, 2017, 12:00PM), http://www.alaskajournal.com/2017-03-29/ubergets-lift-senate-authorization [https://perma.cc/HGX3-FS89]; See also Uber Settles with
Alaska over Unpaid Workers’ Comp, INSURANCE J. (Sept. 8, 2015)
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2015/09/08/380976.htm
[https://perma.cc/3AL2-YDES].
73.
The Regulations of Labor Platforms, supra note 38, at 33–34.
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legal opposition.74 More recently, the NLRB Boston office filed a
misclassification complaint against Handy Technologies, Inc. which
cyber coordinates home-cleaners and home-cleaning tasks.75 Analysts
predict the outcome of this case—which may take many years—will be
dependent on the political composition of the NLRB.76
Thus, in the “new” gig economy, political regulation addressing
worker grievances has been scant and regulation codifying worker
precarity has been the norm. This inaction to address workers’ issues
has put a tremendous amount of pressure on misclassification cases to
solve the problems posed by the gig economy.
In sharp contrast to state-initiated actions (or lack thereof) to
address the precarity of on-demand gig workers, private actors have
mobilized to regulate Uber on employment issues. Plaintiffs’ class
action attorneys have filed dozens of misclassification cases against ondemand platform companies. For example, between 2012 and 2016,
misclassification cases constituted approximately one-third of litigation
against Uber.77 Almost all pressure to regulate the gig work produced
by on-demand platform companies has thus arisen in the judicial
context.78 And despite extraordinary legal hurdles posed by expensive
discovery, financial incentives to settle, and uncertain arbitration laws,
the majority of commentators agree that, “[t]he most effective way for
[gig] workers to resolve the question of whether they are employees or
independent contractors is a class-action lawsuit.”79 But none of these
lawsuits have yet achieved anything but settlements—which, while
potentially important for temporary wealth-distribution and
deterrence—leave the issue of worker identity unresolved.80 The
question remains, however, if one of these cases overcame the
arbitration hurdle,81 certified a large class, and won employee status,
74.
See supra note 29; Uber Technologies, Inc., NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD:
CASES & DECISIONS (Sep. 24, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/20-CA-160720
[https://perma.cc/92XW-2CS2].
75.
Josh Eidelson, U.S. Labor Board Complaint Says On-Demand Cleaners
Are
Employees,
BLOOMBERG, POLITICS (Aug.
30,
2017,
11:07AM)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-31/u-s-labor-board-complaint-sayson-demand-cleaners-are-employees [https://perma.cc/6AB3-Y4BN].
76.
Id.
77.
Regulating Disruption, supra note 9, at 15.
78.
Labor Platforms and Gig Work, supra note 5, at 21–22.
79.
Charlotte Garden, What Would a Merrick Garland Confirmation Mean for
the
Future
of
Gig
Work?,
Atlantic
(May
11,
2016)
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/05/supreme-court-gigwork/482115/ [https://perma.cc/EP3C-SKJK].
80.
The Regulations of Labor Platforms, supra note 38, at 31–32.
81.
For an insightful analysis of how arbitration agreements hinder
misclassification class actions in the gig economy see Garden, supra note 79.
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might it produce much-needed security and stability for workers? The
answer, as I discuss below, is likely no.
II.

THE ANTECEDENT GIG ECONOMY & THE PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

In Part II, I examine three best-outcome case studies of similarlysituated gig workers in the antecedent gig economy who, absent the
technology of labor platforms, performed transportation services as
independent contractors at the behest of companies. In each case study,
firms structured themselves to avoid the risks and costs associated with
employment. In Tracy v. Yellow Cab, a legal-aid non-profit
organization sued San Francisco’s largest taxi companies, alleging that
their taxi workers were employees for purposes of safety-net benefits—
unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation.82 In Friendly Cab
v. NLRB, attorneys for the Teamsters challenged the classification of
Oakland taxi drivers as independent contractors under the National
Labor Relations Act and prevailed, securing for drivers the right to
collectively bargain. And in Alexander, plaintiffs’ attorneys sued
FedEx, contesting the independent contractor status of drivers for wage
and income purposes under California’s labor code.83 Judges examined
the facts of each case in relation to the applicable legal definition of
employee and found the workers to have been misclassified by the
firms.84 And yet, in all three cases, employee rights were either
unsustained or never realized. Based on interviews with workers, their
attorneys, and labor advocates, I describe and make sense of these
outcomes.
A.

Tracy v. Yellow Cab Cooperative

In 1996, taxi workers in San Francisco won employee rights on
summary judgment—an unlikely outcome in a misclassification case,
especially one that had dragged on for so long. This was one of very
few misclassification legal victories achieved on behalf of workers in
the taxi industry nationally. Four years after the Legal Aid SocietyEmployment Law Center filed a class action on behalf of taxi workers
against San Francisco’s largest cab companies, Superior Court Judge
William Cahill extended workers’ compensation and unemployment
82.
Tracy v. Yellow Cab Coop., No. 938786 at 10–11 (Super. Ct. Cal. Oct.
22, 1996) (order granting motion for summary judgement).
83.
Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir.
2014).
84.
See id. at 997; Tracy, No. 938786 at 10–11.
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rights to five thousand San Francisco taxi drivers,85 those who labored
for Yellow Cab, DeSoto, and Luxor.86 In the same decision, Judge
Cahill banned these companies from charging taxi workers any cash
bond or “security deposit” as a condition of employment.87 One of the
lead attorneys for the taxi workers—Christopher Ho—told reporters that
the decision came at a time when “the big trend [wa]s for employers to
try to characterize people as independent contractors.”88 Plaintiff taxi
workers were thrilled with the outcome.89
Many in the California labor advocacy community understood the
decision in Tracy as a “turning of the tide”—an example of how
California courts could and would deliver a judicial check on businesses
that misused the independent contractor business model to evade
responsibility for their workers.90 Though attorneys did not secure an
appellate decision to generate precedent on the matter, they hoped that
the outcome would help San Francisco workers and simultaneously
deter other taxi companies from utilizing the “leasing” model.
But by the time I began working with San Francisco taxi drivers in
2008—twelve years after the Tracy decision—leasing was the ubiquitous
practice of taxi companies nationally and the rights established in Tracy
had mostly been lost to time.91 Few workers in the industry knew that
these safety-net benefits were available to them.92 Taxi companies by
and large did not comply with California laws regarding unemployment
insurance, and they either threatened drivers who needed to file for

85.
Christopher Cook, Protecting the Cabbies: Despite Landmark Lawsuit,
S.F. Drivers’ Working Conditions Remain Grim, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, Nov. 20, 1996
at 25.
86.
Tracy v. Yellow Cab Coop., No. 938786, slip op. at 1 (Super. Ct. Cal.
Feb. 10, 1997).
87.
Id. at 2.
88.
Dolores Ziegler, Cabbie is Employee, Not for-Hire Worker, S.F. DAILY
J., Oct. 24, 1996.
89.
John True, the plaintiffs’ attorney who initially filed Tracy v. Yellow Cab
in 1992, told me of the workers’ responses:
I remember the day we got the decision. We had a meeting. Drivers were
extremely happy and pleased with the representative because we had won.
There was some discontent that we didn’t get them back wages. But they
were happy to have gotten up over management and beaten the companies’
lawyers. They also felt good that they didn’t have to pay the security
deposit. It reaffirmed the fact that they saw the lease correctly and knew it
was a sham.
Interview with John True, former Workers’ Rights Attorney, Emp’t Law Center-Legal
Aid Society, in Berkeley, Cal. (Feb. 29, 2012).
90.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
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workers’ compensation or fought them tooth and nail. Only one relic of
the Tracy victory remained: twice between 2008 and 2010, workeradvocates successfully evoked the decision to rein in companies that
demanded security deposits.

Illustration 2: Excerpt from a letter written by a taxi worker plaintiff to attorneys at the
Employment Law Center praising Judge Cahill’s decision. He emphasizes, “[i]t is now
payback time for these past 20 years of unfair and illegal labor practices . . .”

In this case study, I analyze both the pre- and post-litigation stories
of taxi worker plaintiffs who participated in this misclassification
litigation. I explain how taxi workers in San Francisco became
independent contractors, and how Tracy was conceived as a proxy
battle to challenge the misclassification trend. I also tell the story of
how the lawsuit impacted workers after the case was won. Unlike many
class actions, Tracy was litigated by public interest attorneys for whom
worker agency was vital, and workers informed every stage of
litigation. But in spite of the legal victory, the enduring impact of Tracy
on even the most active worker-plaintiffs neither sustained long-term
mobilization, nor the mobilization of their employee rights.
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WORKERS FIRST: LITIGATION, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL
CHANGE

Public interest attorney John True filed Tracy v. Yellow Cab in
1991, just two years after the California Supreme Court decided S.G.
Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations.93 In
Borello, the court laid out a broad definition of who constituted an
employee under California law. The decision held that for California
state employee rights protections (including wage-related rights,
unemployment insurance, and workers’ compensation), the most
significant consideration of whether a worker was an employee was if
the putative employer retained the “right to control work details.”94 But
the court also gave weight to other factors, including whether the
worker who performed the “services [wa]s engaged in a distinct
occupation or business” from the putative employer.95 The addition of
this and other factors to the traditional “right to control” test for
employee status made it more likely that putative independent
contractors would be found misclassified.
Soon after the Borello decision, John True, who founded
Employment Law Center’s Workers’ Rights Clinic—a workers’ rights
clinic for low-income workers in San Francisco, began to win cases for
taxi drivers who came to the clinic. True explained the genesis of the
Tracy litigation:
Early on, we started seeing taxicab drivers come to the clinic.
One guy, Garth Chojnowski, comes to mind. He was living in
his car and got fired. He was a driver for Yellow, and applied
93.
769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989).
94.
Id. at 403–04.
95.
Id. at 404. The court emphasized that in addition to whether or not a
putative employer has the right to control the means and manner in which the work is
done, additional factors should be considered to determine whether the worker is an
employee. Id. Those factors include: 1) Whether the person performing services is
engaged in an occupation or business distinct from that of the principal; 2) Whether or
not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal or alleged employer; 3)
Whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place
for the person doing the work; 4) The alleged employee's investment in the equipment
or materials required by his or her task or his or her employment of helpers; 5)
Whether the service rendered requires a special skill; 6) The kind of occupation, with
reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
principal or by a specialist without supervision; 7) The alleged employee's opportunity
for profit or loss depending on his or her managerial skill; 8) The length of time for
which the services are to be performed; 9) The degree of permanence of the working
relationship; 10) The method of payment, whether by time or by the job; and 11)
Whether or not the parties believe they are creating an employer-employee relationship
may have some bearing on the question. Id.
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for unemployment insurance through the clinic. We won.
That replicated itself a number of times over—with workers’
compensation claims being the most common. The most
notorious workers’ compensation case that I remember was of
a driver who got assaulted by a customer and suffered
permanent physical and mental injuries. He was one of the
named plaintiffs in Tracy.96

A number of the taxi drivers who came to the Employment Law
Center’s Workers’ Rights Clinic assumed that they were owed safetynet protections because they had worked as taxi drivers before
companies began utilizing the “leasing” practice.
In the late 1970s, San Francisco taxi drivers—like many drivers
across the country—lost their access to employee protections when taxi
companies re-ordered themselves through the practice of leasing.97
Rather than paying taxi workers a guaranteed wage, companies began
to ask drivers to pay to work. Drivers paid a rental fee and gasoline
expenses for each shift, and in turn, they kept all earnings from fares
collected. Because of the alleged lack of employer control inherent in
the practice of leasing, taxi workers were subsequently considered to be
“independent contractors.”98 The Teamsters, which had represented San
Francisco taxi workers before the ascent of the leasing practice,
challenged the status of leasing taxi workers as independent contractors
for purposes of collective bargaining, but the courts found for the taxi
companies under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).99 By 1979,
taxi drivers were left without either a union or basic on-the-job
protections.100
Based on the broad California definition of “employee” laid out in
Borello and many individual administrative victories, True convened a
group of taxi workers with the intention of trying to standardize safetynet benefits in the industry. In a case that could have been brought
without workers under California’s consumer protections laws, True
chose to formulate this misclassification class action through and with
taxi worker plaintiffs.101 In many class action contexts, the named
96.
Interview with John True, supra note 89.
97.
See Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?, supra note 2, at 90, 97.
98.
Id.
99.
Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc., Nos. 20-RC-14735; 20-RC-14736 (NLRB
Mar. 27, 1979).
100. Id.
101. In administrative hearings, the outcome does not affect similarly situated
workers, just the individual who filed the complaint. See Charles C. Ames & Steven C.
McCracken, Framing Regulatory Standards to Avoid Formal Adjudication: The FDA as
a Case Study, 64 CAL. L. REV. 14, 46 (1976). However, when a class action is filed in
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plaintiffs figure in only in a symbolic capacity, with the effective
control almost always in the hands of the attorneys.102 But as a public
interest attorney, True—and later Christopher Ho who served as cocounsel on the case—perceived of this litigation, from start to finish,
not just as advancing taxi workers’ interests, but also as empowering
taxi workers to mobilize and enact control over their work lives. True
told me, “[W]e wanted them as a group to stand up and confront—face
to face—management. Giving those drivers a voice was a huge thing
for me.”103
The problem, as True and Ho encountered it during the course of
four years of complex litigation, was that no single “worker
perspective” existed. In fact, divisive worker politics almost fractured
the case. The reality was that not all workers wanted to be employees.
And even amongst those who did, the decision to sue for safety-net
benefits alone was met with contention. John True explained:
We made the political decision to sue only for safety-net type
benefits . . . not [for the drivers] to be considered employees
generally. For example, we didn’t sue for minimum wage or
overtime because by and large drivers did not pay taxes, and
we didn’t want to make them vulnerable during discovery.
Some of the drivers were mad about this.104
Ho echoed this, “I remember the tensions between the main
drivers. We had to decertify part of the class action because of the
divisiveness among the class. . . . It was very painful.”105
Despite these difficulties, even during the throes of the case, True
and Ho met regularly with driver-plaintiffs, and together, the drivers

court, the doctrine of res judicata applies. See Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014). Therefore, the outcome of the case has an impact on all similarly
situated workers. A win in a class action is thus much more powerful for workers than
an individual administrative win.
102. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 189, 213 (1987).
103. Interview with John True, supra note 89.
104. Interview with John True, supra note 89. A central critique in the
literature on public interest lawyering and social change has been the all too common
dominating and domineering role of lawyers. See Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest
Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879, 1916–25 (2007). In the
Tracy case, however, the lead attorneys were acutely aware of these power dynamics
and went to great lengths to make sure that workers were at the center of every
decision.
105. Interview with Christopher Ho, Senior Staff Attorney, Law at Work
(formerly the Employment Law Center-Legal Aid Society), in S.F., Cal. (Feb. 15,
2012).
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voted on all litigation decisions. Both attorneys described combative
meetings in which they went out of their way to build consensus among
the class. True said:
We had so many meetings with drivers to decide what to do
[throughout the litigation] . . . We would meet before and
after court and settlement hearings. We met with a core group
of thirty to forty drivers each time. These were long,
contentious meetings where we tried to articulate the goals of
the lawsuit and what we could accomplish. . . . Then we’d
have more meetings with individual drivers around their
cases. I remember thinking, ‘Why don’t we just litigate the
way we want and stop all of these meetings?’ It occurred to
me that it would have been easier without the drivers. But . .
. it would have been a terrible mistake [to exclude them from
the decision-making process] . . . I can remember half a
dozen times when we were in court where drivers got to be
heard and companies had to listen. They heard the B.S. the
management said in court, and they could actually respond to
it. . . . Giving drivers a voice was a huge thing for me, and
part of the case that I am really proud of.106
True’s memories underscore the remarkable lengths to which his
team went to build consensus and maintain agency for the workers
amidst litigation decisions. Joe Tracy, the lead plaintiff, remembered
these meetings as well. Tracy was passionate about drivers’ rights and
had witnessed the reality of taxi work both before and after the switch
to leasing and independent contracting.107
Despite the eventual victory on summary judgment, Joe Tracy was
so exhausted by the case that he was not motivated to fight for workers’
rights after it ended.108 Prior to the case, Tracy had been politicized
through his own experiences with injustice and indignity at work.109

106. Interview with John True, supra note 89.
107. Interview with Joe Tracy, Cab Driver, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 13, 2013).
108. Id.
109. Joe Tracy recounted his moment of politicization around workers’ rights
issues:
I’m very regular so I don’t really need to use the bathroom [at work],
except one day for some reason, I was just off schedule. The bathroom at
Luxor on that day was about six inches deep in sewage, I couldn’t go in
there. And I needed to use the bathroom. So I just walked into the
administrative building at Luxor, went in and used the bathroom. [I] [c]ame
out, and Mary Warner, who eventually became the president – she was
standing right there at the door waiting for me to come out and when I came
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These experiences had made him a leader amongst taxi-worker
advocates, and, throughout the case, he had persisted. But afterward,
he, like True and Ho, and the other drivers, was drained by the
tensions among the class and the vicious lawyering of the cab
companies. Tracy said that he felt he had done his part, “[E]ver since
the end of this exhaustive case, I have kept my head down pretty
much.”110 Years after the win, the new president of Luxor Cab, Tracy’s
employer, asked Joe Tracy whether he was going to be a troublemaker.
Tracy answered, I did my bit for my rights and the rights of my fellow
cab drivers . . . I’m done. I’m exhausted. I’m not going to be
advocating anymore for anybody unless somebody messes with me in
particular, so don’t mess with me. Leave me alone.111
Tracy was no doubt an extraordinary win for taxi workers. But
despite the best efforts of the public interest attorneys to maintain
worker agency through the process, the case complicated both the
possibilities of misclassification litigation and the aspiration to leverage
litigation victories to empower workers towards mobilization. The
length of the litigation, due in large part to the vigorous and wellfinanced lawyering of the taxi companies, exhausted workers like Tracy
who missed work and forfeited pay to participate.112 Rather than
mobilizing the collective power of workers, the difficulties of the case
diverted the energies of potential leaders. As True aptly reflected over
out, she started waving her finger right in my face and yelling at me about
how ‘you drivers, [this and that],’ you know, I was just saying the
bathroom out there is just too bad, I couldn’t use it. And she kept yelling at
me and sort of blaming me for all of this. And I just kind of ducked my
head and crawled out of there as she was, you know, yelling at me all the
way out of the building. And over the next three days, I went from a slow
simmer about that to a rolling boil. I was completely pissed, and I would
always think back to how my mother taught us three kids to always be nice
to everybody, but don’t take any crap from anybody. That was in my genes.
Interview with Joe Tracy, Cab Driver, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 8, 2013).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Joe Tracy said:
[T]here were so many meetings where I would miss work and lose pay and
such. And there was—you know, anxiety about are we winning this case or
losing this case, what’s going to happen? And then, there was anxiety about
people at the Employment Law Center, what is going on here? Are you
trying to squeeze us out of a deal, you know, after all these years and all
this effort? So there was much anxiety and pressure and worry about
whether it was going to be a win or a loss, you know, so that just
thoroughly exhausted me after—even after we won, it was like that’s it, you
know, now I’m going to go live my happy life. Unless somebody messes
with me, because I still go the Irish-German in me, you know.
Id.
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two decades later, “I’m not sure if the lawsuit prevented further
mobilizing . . . that’s an issue that pervades employment law.”113

Image 3: Joe Tracy in his home in San Francisco in 2010. In recounting his role in the
misclassification litigation, he told me, “[T]here was so much anxiety and pressure and
worry about whether it was going to be a win or a loss, you know, so that just
thoroughly exhausted me after—even after we won, it was like that’s it, you know, now
I’m going to go live my happy life.”114

2. LONG TERM IMPACTS OF TRACY: RIGHTS WITHOUT POWER
Despite the unintentional consequences of Tracy on long term taxi
worker organizing and mobilization, the decision undeniably aided
vulnerable workers in the immediate aftermath of the decision. As

113.
114.

Interview with John True, supra note 89.
Interview with Joe Tracy, supra note 109.
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Christopher Ho explained to the media after the win, “You have these
horror stories of [drivers] getting clubbed over the head, pinned
between cabs, and going to S.F. General [Hospital] . . . The gross
injustice of this is that cabbies [would] get injured on the job and the
company [would] fight them tooth and nail [in workers’ compensation
claims].”115 Tracy legally ensured that taxi workers were “employees”
for purposes of unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation.116
In what OSHA considers one of the most dangerous industries in the
nation, workers finally had a safety-net to fall back upon if they were
injured and lost their job. In my research, however, conducted many
years after the Tracy decision, few drivers knew of the right to
workers’ compensation, and those who did know were afraid to use the
right. No one but older worker advocates who had labored in the
industry when Tracy was decided knew about their right to
unemployment insurance. And Yellow Cab had attempted to reinstate
their security deposit requirement at least twice.
Many taxi workers in my research who were aware of their right
to workers’ compensation stated that in the case of an injury, they
would not file a claim. One worker leaned in and whispered to me
during our interview, “They [the taxi cab companies] blacklist you. I
had a friend who filed. I know. He never worked in the industry
again.”117 Another driver said, “I was giving a driver a ride to work,
and he said he got rear ended and he said the cab company told him if
you get an attorney and apply for workers’ comp, you’re going to lose
your shifts and he didn’t, so he just lived with his injury.”118 Whether
or not the rumors of “black-listing” taxi workers and discouraging them
from filing workers’ compensation were true, they speak to the relative
powerlessness of the taxi worker in enforcing what, through the
strenuous litigation in Tracy v. Yellow Cab, became his “right.” The
workers feared that if they did file for workers’ compensation, after
their recovery, they would never find work in the industry again.
Unlike with workers’ compensation, only two workers in my
research (both of whom were tangentially involved in Tracy) knew
about the right to unemployment insurance. Even Paul Gillespie, a
longtime taxi driver who served for many years on San Francisco’s
Taxi Commission, had never heard that workers had won the right to

115. Cook, supra note 85, at 25.
116. Tracy v. Yellow Cab Coop., No. 938786, slip op. at 2 (Super. Ct. Cal.
Feb. 10, 1997).
117. See supra note 29.
118. Id.
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file for unemployment.119 It was unclear whether this was because cab
companies had effectively stamped out the knowledge by discouraging
such claims or whether the information had been lost to time. My
research also uncovered that at Luxor Cab in 2012, the one
unemployment insurance claim that had been filed had been rejected by
the EDD (Employment Development Department), despite the Tracy
decision. While this decision was not published and neither Luxor’s
attorneys nor management would share why the claim was rejected, my
conjecture is that the more recent restructuring of taxi firms—through
the rise of long-term leasing and the decline of day-leasing—led the
administrative body to determine that Luxor taxi workers were now
“independent contractors” and no longer “employees,” as they had
been at the time of the Tracy litigation.
Though both unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation
have dwindled as enforced rights for cab drivers, San Francisco taxi
workers did use collective power to mobilize the one remaining “win”
in Tracy: the prohibition against cash bonds or security deposits.120
Twice, in both 2008 and 2010, Yellow Cab issued notices to drivers to
“pre-pay” monthly for their shifts.121 Yellow Cab drivers were told that
management had changed the terms of the contract, illustrating the onesided nature of these contracts, and warned that if drivers did not
prepay for the entire month, they would lose their assigned shifts. The
United Taxicab Workers (UTW)—a driver-led workers’ rights
organization—mobilized workers, informing them that this was illegal
under Tracy.122 Bud Hazelkorn, then president of UTW, threatened a
lawsuit seeking injunctive relief.123 Quietly, weeks later, Yellow Cab
notices about the pre-payment were taken down, and drivers informed
that the change had been “postponed.”124
The conundrum of Tracy reflects the larger problem with effecting
individual employee rights for workers in a “grey zone.” Unlike the
right to collectively bargain under the NLRA, individual employee
rights and litigation attempting to enforce those rights do not address
the inequalities integral to the contractual theory of employment. In the
case of Tracy, policing individual employee rights through litigation
after the formation of the contract between worker and employer did

119. Interview with Paul Gillespie, Taxi Driver and former Commissioner,
S.F. Taxi Comm’n, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 23, 2011).
120. See supra note 29.
121. Tracy v. Yellow Cab Coop., No. 938786, ¶ 3 (1997).
122. See infra Ill. 4. For more on the history and work of the UTW see Dubal,
The Drive to Precarity, supra note 2, at 111–20.
123. See supra note 29.
124. Id.
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not destabilize the employer’s dominant position. While taxi workers
were granted individual protections, the asymmetry of power between
them and the cab companies was left untouched. The structural power
of capital won over a hard-fought for legal decision. And perhaps
worse, the outrage and energy of the lead plaintiff waned.

Illustration 4: United Taxicab Workers flier from 2010, urging drivers not to prepay for
their shifts and informing them of the ruling in Tracy v. Yellow Cab.

A. Friendly Cab v. NLRB
Analytically, the next case study leaves off where Tracy ended.
The key reason that Tracy did not have a long-term impact on the lives
of taxi workers was drivers’ limited power to leverage the hard-won
safety-net protections. But what might have happened if the taxi
workers had been employees not just for one-off rights but under
National Labor Relations Act—that is, if they had the legally-enforced
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power to collectively bargain with their employers? Would
misclassification litigation in the NLRA context have been more
effective?
In analyzing Friendly Cab v. NLRB, I examine the pre- and postlitigation realities of a taxi worker mobilization across the bay from San
Francisco—in Oakland. After years of organizing, protesting, and
holding improbable work stoppages, these taxi workers petitioned for
employee recognition for unionizing purposes. As in San Francisco, the
taxicab company employers structured their work through the practice
of leasing to avoid liabilities associated with employment; but at each
level of appeal, the courts found that the drivers were indeed
employees. The Ninth Circuit opined that despite the leasing practice,
the employers exerted unusual control over the means and manner of
the work and that the taxi drivers had limited entrepreneurial
opportunities.125
And yet, despite the fact that the appellate court found that these
taxi workers had the right to collectively bargain and recognized them
as a bargaining unit, no union contract was ever established. In fact,
workers never even made it to the bargaining table to hash out the
terms of their work contracts. The real-life hindrances faced by
workers in Friendly Cab were two-fold. First, despite years of worker
organizing and the legal recognition of their bargaining unit, the taxi
drivers still languished under the incredible structural and political
power of their employers. Second, surprisingly, the taxi workers never
really wanted to be employees. Their primary goal was cooperative
self-ownership, but this objective was never embraced either by city
regulators or by the union that supported them through the litigation.
1. BEFORE THE LITIGATION: ORGANIZING FOR SELF-OWNERSHIP
A battle that began with worker protests in 1996 and culminated in
a Ninth Circuit decision finding workers to have been misclassified
under the NLRA appeared to be a perfect success story of collective
bargaining laws in the United States. The story leading up to the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Friendly Cab is remarkable—involving almost a
decade of resistance by low-income immigrant workers, including
refugees from Afghanistan and immigrants from Nigeria and India.
Many of the taxi workers in Oakland, California who worked for the
multiple taxi companies operated by a single family entered the
business because of both the relative freedom allotted to them by the
leasing practice and because, despite their professional status in their

125.

NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008).
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home country, they were carved out of similar work here. Their work
lives as Oakland-based taxi drivers, however, were both precarious and
oppressive. In addition to their low earnings, drivers complained of the
frequent and unpredictable disciplinary actions taken by their employers
(mostly in the form of fines) and the degree of capricious control
exerted upon them while at work.
Responding to these conditions in 1996, almost one hundred
drivers held days-long protests, seeking municipal recognition of their
enumerated grievances.126 Conceiving of themselves as a “union,” they
complained to Oakland’s public safety committee that their cab
companies refused to take basic measures to keep them safe, despite
legal regulations mandating certain protections. For example, some of
the companies would not install protective shields in their taxis, as
required by law. Drivers also raised serious concerns about “faulty
brakes, shoddy repairs, and lack of insurance for drivers.”127 Their
concerns—about both worker and consumer safety—fell on mostly deaf
ears. The Singh family—who owned several taxi cab companies in
Oakland, including the three largest—were powerful lobbyists who,
drivers told me, had many friends in city government.128
By late 2001, during the national drop in tourism following the
September 11th attacks, these Oakland-based taxi drivers were
earning—on average—$25,000 a year, hardly enough to support their
families in one of the most expensive areas in the world.129 Their dire
economic situation led to a new round of mobilizing. Anwar Zadran, a
refugee from Afghanistan who had worked for Friendly Cab since the
early 1990s, emerged as a worker leader. Leveraging his charismatic
personality, reputation for honesty, and boundless energy, Zadran
organized over one hundred taxi workers into an association called the
East Bay Drivers’ Association (EBDA). Reflecting on this feat years
later, Zadran said:
126. Rick DelVecchio, Cabbies Break for Union OK, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25,
1996, at A14.
127. Anwar Zadran, Blurring the Line: Workers in the New Tech Economy at
the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law Symposium: On the Precipice,
Workers in the New Tech Economy (Feb. 24, 2016).
128. While most of this was anecdotal, there was some documented evidence of
the relationship between the Signh family and government officials in Oakland. See,
e.g., Zusha Elinson, Dhar Mann, Indicted Oakland Pot Entrepreneur, Leaned On
Political Relationships, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 14, 2012, 6:17 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/14/dhar-mann_n_1885701.html
[https://perma.cc/J8WE-H7SC].
129. See supra note 29 (describing underlying interviews). See also, Helene
Blatter, All’s Fare in Cabbies’ Union Fight, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Oct. 9, 2002),
https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/alls-fare-in-cabbies-unionfight/Content?oid=1068543 [https://perma.cc/5NRJ-F6KD].
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We were mostly from our different countries. They [the cab
companies] were trying to take advantage of us because we
didn’t know the law. They charged us fines when we say
anything [in opposition] to them. We also needed vacation
time and sick time [to deal] with the rest of our problems.
That was one of the reasons that I gathered the drivers
together to be unionized.130

Like Zadran, members of the EBDA were frustrated by the degree
of control exerted over their work lives by both the cab companies and
the city regulators. The drivers’ complaints against the city were twofold. First, they alleged that the city did not provide them with an
adequate number of taxi stands to pick up fares. The existing stands
were always busy, and drivers who tried to hustle in other parts of the
city—in parking places or at the curb—were slapped with tickets by the
police department. These tickets often cost them more than half a day’s
income.131 Second, the drivers wanted the city to issue taxi medallions
to working drivers—instead of to owners of existing taxi companies.
The drivers wanted more control over their personal and professional
lives. This supposed freedom and flexibility of taxi work had been a
primary reason many of them had become drivers in the first place.
The drivers’ complaints against the companies they worked for
were many, but most stemmed from exploitation and unusually high
degree of control exerted by the cab companies. The Singhs owned
nearly sixty percent of Oakland’s medallions or taxi permits. Among
other things, drivers complained that the companies operated by this
family compelled them to sign blank contracts that were later filled out
by the company, that they charged higher leases to drivers who
complained, and that they gave the best taxis and lower rates to Indian
immigrant drivers (the Singhs are originally from India).132 They also
alleged that the family “force[d] drivers to pay exorbitant repair bills in
violation of their contracts, skim[med] off percentages of voucher
reimbursements that belong to [the] drivers, fail[ed] to insure cabs and
force[d] drivers to use cabs that [were] ‘battered and non-roadworthy,

130. Interview with Anwar Zadran, Former EBDA Leader, S.F., Cal. (Aug.
2015).
131. DEBORAH EDGERLY, CITY OF OAKLAND OFFICE OF THE CITY ADM’R,
AGENDA
REPORT
(Feb.
27,
2007)
http://clerkwebsvr1.oaklandnet.com/attachments/15631.pdf [https://perma.cc/PML37TYU].
132. Charles Burress, Oakland Cabbies File Bias, Fraud Suit Against 5 Firms /
‘Fed Up’ Immigrant Drivers Claim Exploitation, SFGATE (Aug. 13, 2002, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Oakland-cabbies-file-bias-fraud-suit-against-52783304.php [https://perma.cc/EU4X-CL7V].
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lack heating and air-conditioning, or belch smog.’”133 Drivers who
complained, they said, were either disciplined or terminated.134
Since their drivers’ complaints were directed both at Oakland city
officials and the cab company owners, the EBDA’s organizing occurred
along two tracks simultaneously. Workers both pushed the city to give
them more control over their lives and pressured the cab companies to
do the same. The drivers, represented by Berkeley attorney Donald
Jelinek, sued the five affiliated taxi companies then operated by the
Singhs for extortion, fraud, race discrimination, and retaliation.135 For
confidential reasons, the drivers eventually took on the case pro per and
the litigation was later dismissed.136
However, in the process, Jelinek referred the EBDA to the
Teamsters Local 7 for representation. The Teamsters, excited to have
found a group of organized drivers to represent, closely examined the
work realities imposed by the cab companies. Though the Teamsters
had failed to establish employee status in other independent contracting
contexts (mainly trucking) given the high degree of control exerted by
the Singhs, they were hopeful for a better outcome with the EBDA.137
As the Teamsters advanced their asks of the taxicab companies, the
EBDA also heavily lobbied city officials to give them medallions or
permits to operate their own taxi business. Zadran and other drivers
explained to me that their dream had been to establish a worker-run taxi
company. The taxi company they envisioned was a worker-cooperative
in which the members of the EBDA shared both revenue and power.
They believed that through self-ownership, they could better realize the
demands of their non-work lives while also having a say in how they
conducted themselves at work. Many of the immigrant men in the
EBDA shared close friendships and bonds that they hoped would serve
them well in a cooperative context. The most pressing question for
them was how to get the medallions. The drivers believed that the
Singhs were in violation of the terms of use for some of their
medallions, and they lobbied the city to take those permits back and reissue them to workers. Despite much advocacy by EBDA leaders—
some of which I participated in—the city never relinquished. Behind
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. This case was later dismissed. Attorneys for the drivers say the reasons
the case was dismissed are confidential. The docket record indicates that soon after the
initial complaint was filed, the drivers represented themselves pro per. They did not
respond to discovery requests, and the judge dismissed the case some 4 years later.
136. One of the attorneys who assisted Jelinek on this case recalled, “These
were nice guys. But not always the easiest to deal with.” Telephone Interview with
Myron Moskowitz, Legal Dir., Moskovitz Appellate Team (Aug. 10, 2017).
137. Interview with Anwar Zadran, supra note 130.
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closed doors, sympathetic city officials explained to the drivers that the
political capital of the Singh family tied their hands.
2. LITIGATION FOR EMPLOYEE STATUS: GETTING FRIENDLY CAB TO
THE BARGAINING TABLE
In 2002, at the same time that the EBDA sued Friendly Cab in
state court for various civil wrongs, they also—with the assistance of
the Teamsters Local 70—petitioned the NLRB to be certified as a
bargaining unit.138 While the drivers continued to seek their own
medallions, both the city and the Teamsters urged the drivers down the
path of “employee status” to get the Singhs to bargain with them. When
asked whether he knew that the drivers’ original goal had been to get
medallions to start their own business, Bob Aiello, the Teamster’s
Business Agent who worked with the EBDA over many years,
admitted:
Yes, oh yeah, they saw the value of the medallions and they
wanted their own. But then they would really become
independent contractors and that wasn’t our objective. My
objective was that they were not independent contractors, but
[that] they were employees of Friendly Cab. They [the
company owners] were blackmailing them and abusing them.
My position, well, Local 70’s position, was that we wanted to
stop the abuse and negotiate a fair collective bargaining
agreement that would give them rights and security and
retirement benefits.139
The Teamsters’ objectives reflected the traditional path to address
worker grievances: get workers under the employee umbrella, help
them achieve bargaining rights, negotiate a fair contract, and increase
collective worker power through union membership. Local 70 wanted
to give the taxi workers in Oakland the kind of employee life that union
officials knew was safe and secure. City regulators felt similarly. Once
the EBDA was legally considered a union, the city could continue to
work with known actors—the existing cab company owners—but their
regulatory load would be significantly lightened. The welfare of the taxi
workers would be addressed through private negotiations with the
collective bargaining unit, rather than in and through public hearings.

138.
139.
11, 2017).

Id.
Interview with Bob Aiello, Former Bus. Agent, Teamsters Local 70 (Aug.
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Both city regulators and the Teamsters were encouraged by the
fact that on the face of things, the Singh family treated the drivers like
employees. According to both the workers and their attorneys, the
Singhs—unlike many taxicab companies whose business model relied
on the practice of long-term leasing—exerted an unusual amount of
control over the daily work lives of the taxi drivers. In the course of
my research, I found that in San Francisco, many drivers opted into the
long-term leasing practice because they typically only had to go into the
taxi company garages upon occasion to pay a fixed rate to the cab
company. All fares were then typically collected without accounting to
the employer. The workers were otherwise free to work as they
pleased—picking up fares on their own terms and in their own time. If
they needed to stop driving to pick their child up from school, or to get
coffee, then that was their prerogative. Since the 1970s, when the
leasing and long-term leasing practices began to proliferate in taxi
companies across the country, courts repeatedly found that the practice
created a “strong inference” that taxi companies were not exerting
control over the “means and manner” of the workers’ performance, and
that consequently, the drivers were independent contractors,
unprotected by labor and employment laws.140
However, the long-term leasing practice at the Singhs’
establishments did not work in this way. Taxi driver plaintiffs relayed
that the Singhs’ “flat rate” was not flat at all—but differed amongst
workers. If the owners liked the driver, he got a lower rate. Drivers
were not allowed to develop their own clientele and could only take
fares from the company dispatcher. The owners also exerted a
significant degree of control in regulating the manner in which the
drivers drove—requiring drivers to adhere to a dress code, mandating
that they accept “vouchers,” charging them “processing fees,” and
requiring that they carry advertisements on their vehicles from which
they earned no revenue. The owners even deployed a “road manager”
who monitored drivers while they were working. The drivers also had
to pay for accidents and maintenance and adhere to a training manual
that outlined requirements above and beyond those outlined in city
regulations. In the NLRB hearings, drivers testified that any verbal
disagreements with the cab company owners or managers would lead to
additional fines.
Based on these facts, and more, in 2002, the NLRB regional
director found the drivers to be statutory employees and directed a
140. See, e.g., NLRB v. Associated Diamond Cabs, Inc., 702 F.2d 912, 925
(11th Cir. 1983); City Cab Co. of Orlando v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 261, 264 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing Committee v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862,
878 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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union election.141 But the owners of the cab companies were
immediately recalcitrant, claiming that the drivers were independent
contractors by law.142 They appealed to a three-member NLRB panel.
On review, the drivers won, and once again, the cab companies
appealed.143 As the case went through the lengthy appeals process, the
drivers continued their mobilization towards self-ownership. In 2006,
amidst worker advocacy and lobbying of city regulators to issue
medallions to them, the city council affirmed their support for the
collective bargaining path. The Oakland City Council passed a
resolution “[e]ncouraging [f]air [b]argaining and [e]mployee
[r]ecognition for Oakland’s [t]axi [d]rivers,”144 while continuing their
refusal to issue even a single medallion to EBDA advocates.145
The Singhs appealed Friendly Cab until it reached the Ninth
Circuit.146 Finally, in 2008, the appellate court found that the workers
at these cab companies organized under the East Bay Drivers’
Association were, in fact, employees.147 In a strongly-worded opinion,
the court affirmed that:
[A] number of factors . . . in their totality compel a finding of
employee status, the most significant of these being Friendly's
prohibition on its drivers’ operating an independent business
and developing entrepreneurial opportunities with customers.
Additional salient indicia of control by Friendly over the
means and manner of its drivers’ performance include: (1)
regulating the details of how drivers must operate their
taxicabs; (2) imposing discipline for refusing or delays in
responding to dispatches; (3) requiring drivers to carry
advertisements without receiving revenue; (4) requiring
drivers to accept vouchers subject to graduated “processing
fees;” (5) prohibiting subleases; (6) imposing a strict dress

141. NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2008).
142. Id. at 1093.
143. Id. at 1102.
144. Oakland, Cal., Res. 79772 C.M.S., A Resolution Encouraging Fair
Bargaining and Employee Recognition for Oakland’s Taxi Drivers (Mar. 7, 2006).
145. A 2007 report to the City Administrator to reform the taxi industry stated
that many of the problems faced by taxi drivers stem from the “excessive power
wielded by the companies,” and relayed that the drivers “have attempted to improve
their bargaining power by unionizing . . . . [but] the large companies do not recognize
the union, contending that the drivers are independent contractors, not employees.”
EDGERLY, supra note 131, at 9–10.
146. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d at 1103.
147. Id.
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code; and (7) requiring training in excess of government
regulations. 148
After twelve years of organizing and six years of litigation, the EBDA
drivers finally had the right to collectively bargain.

Illustration 7: East Bay Drivers’ Association members after the NLRB found in 2004
that drivers were employees of a syndicate of taxi cab companies in Oakland. Anwar
Zadran, voted by the EBDA drivers as their leader and representative, is in front.149

3. FRIENDLY CAB’S EXTRALEGAL VICTORIES
The day that the Ninth Circuit decision came down, in January
2008, the Teamsters press release quoted the EBDA leader, Anwar
Zadran, as saying, “We now have the voice and the power with the
company to receive better benefits and working conditions. This has
been a long time coming.”150 In the same press release, James P. Hoffa,
the Teamsters General President, reflected on the ramifications of this
case on the broader fight against misclassification:

148. Id.
149. Picture by Katy Raddatz in Patrick Hoge, East Bay/ Cabbies Join Union
After Labor Board Rules They’re Employees/ But Owners of the Taxi Companies Refuse
to
Negotiate,
SFGATE,
(July
28,
2004,
4:00
AM)
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/EAST-BAY-Cabbies-join-union-after-laborboard-2738125.php [https://perma.cc/FBQ6-8QVA].
150. Local 70: Contract Bargaining On for East Bay Taxi Drivers, N.CAL.
TEAMSTER, Feb./Mar. 2008, at 4 (Teamsters Joint Council No. 7, S.F., Cal.).
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Companies are now on notice that they cannot skirt the law by
misclassifying their employees as independent contractors, a
system that penalizes workers. From big companies like
FedEx to smaller ones like Friendly Cab, the Teamsters are
working nationwide to make sure this illegal business practice
is erased.151

It seemed like a dream success story—after many, many years of
organizing, appeal after appeal, the underdog workers had won. They
could finally engage in negotiations with the employer.
But that negotiation never happened. Pushing back against the
decision, the company used their significant structural and political
power to resist compliance. As Bob Aiello from Local 70 told me, “In
2008 [after the decision], we tried to get the employers to the
bargaining table, and they kept stonewalling us. They did everything in
their power to not bargain in good faith. This went on and on and
on.”152 Zadran echoed this, “It took a long time, and it didn’t help. The
company has the money.”153
Friendly Cab’s defiance of the Ninth Circuit decision, however,
was only one problem. Both union representatives and drivers attested
to the gradual atrophy of organizing energy among EBDA members
through the many years of litigation. Many EBDA members had lost
faith in the efficacy of the union after more than half a decade of
waiting for enforcement with no result. For those drivers, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision did not appear any different than the previous ones,
which had been ineffective. Aiello reflected on that time and the
struggles he faced with keeping drivers engaged:
After working with the Friendly Cab drivers for some time, I
set up a council [of workers], and we had an election. The
council consisted of four members who were the leaders of
the group. If there were issues, they would be brought to the
council, and if it wasn’t rectified through the council, then,
the council would bring it to me, and I would get involved. . .
. This went on for a period of time; the folks were paying us
$25 per month individually. By the time the decision came
down, most of them had stopped paying. Because it was a
slow process. They thought I would have it wrapped up in a
nice package in a short period of time. I tried to maintain the
151. Teamsters Applaud Court Ruling Allowing Cab Drivers to Unionize,
REUTERS, Jan. 11, 2008, PR NEWSWIRE, Doc. No. 21:48:00.
152. Interview with Bob Aiello, supra note 139.
153. Interview with Anwar Zadran, supra note 130.
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council and hold things together even though they stopped
paying [the $25 monthly fees]. But it was impossible. I had so
much other work to do. (emphasis added).154
Finally, in 2009, without union dues coming in and facing an
intransigent employer, Teamsters Local 70 let go of their
representation. Bob Aiello described a meeting he had with the
President of Teamsters Joint Council 7, Chuck Mack, in which the
decision was made:
Because of the expense and all the attorneys’ fees, my wages,
and everything, Chuck decided to withdraw our
representation. We won the battle, but not the war because we
didn’t achieve the collective bargaining. Chuck thought it was
a good fight, and that case set precedent. But in our situation
here, we could no longer afford to represent them.155
(emphasis added)
Though the union gave up on them, the EBDA drivers did not give
up on their hopes for self-ownership. In April 2009, after thirteen long
years of organizing, the taxi drivers took to the streets again—this time
without union support. They gathered outside City Hall and held a twoday work stoppage, protesting the Singh’s noncompliance with the
Friendly Cab decision and the city’s refusal to issue them medallions.
During this strike, the Singhs finally took extra-legal action. They
towed the leased taxis from in front of the homes of the EBDA leaders.
The drivers sued for retaliation and eventually settled with the Singhs,
but the workers’ leaders did not get their jobs back.
In 2014, I ran into Zadran at a protest in front of Uber’s
headquarters. After losing his job as a taxi driver in Oakland and failing
to get a medallion to start his own company, he was driving for Uber. I
asked Zadran if he was going to start unionizing Uber drivers, and he
laughed with the same optimism I remembered from years before. But
when I reached out to him again two years later, in 2016, he was
downtrodden. Uber had dropped their rates dramatically, and Zadran’s
ability to support his family was diminished. He had been working
tirelessly, sixteen hours a day, seven days a week. I asked if he was
still going to protests or involved in any organizing efforts of Uber

154. Interview with Bob Aiello, supra note 139.
155. Id. The EBDA could not just go to another union because of a provision in
the Teamsters’ governing Articles forbids the practice of “raiding.” Id. The EBDA
would have had to wait a full year before affiliating with another union. Id.

780

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

drivers. He let out a resigned sigh, and with frustration in his voice,
said:
It takes a long time. And it doesn’t help. They have the
money. Plus it’s not worth it. What am I going to get for it?
The union, they are supposed to win the case and get the
company to bargain. Local 70 said they would form the
union, but they give up. It’s very hard to become unionized. I
failed in doing it for just 100 drivers. How can I do it with
these thousands of Uber drivers? And what for?156
Although the Teamsters representative did not regret the time and
energy they put into the case, Zadran did. Economically, physically,
and emotionally, he was worse off than he had been prior to the NLRB
mobilization. And like Joe Tracy, his optimism about law and
organizing had waned.
B. Alexander v. FedEx
The last case study in this Article is perhaps the most important
when examining the labor implications of platform-enabled gig
companies and devising ways to address worker insecurity. Fed-Ex is
the “largest and most successful global transportation company in the
world,” and like today’s biggest on-demand platforms, including Uber,
Fed-Ex was built on a strategy of deregulation, industry disruption, and
risk-shift.157 As Beth Ross, the lead plaintiffs’ attorney in multi-state
misclassification litigation against FedEx noted in reference to the
growth of the gig economy, “In many ways, FedEx legitimized this
conversation about how everyone has a right to be an independent
contractor.”158
In this section, I tell the remarkable story of FedEx, its use of
political influence to facilitate deregulation, and the fierce multi-district
litigation that challenged their use of independent contractors. Based on
interviews with both plaintiffs’ attorneys and plaintiff-workers involved
in two related cases—Estrada v. FedEx159 and Alexander v. FedEx—I
describe how the misclassification litigation victories impacted workers’
lives.

156. Interview with Anwar Zadran, supra note 130.
157. Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1503 (2005).
158. Interview with Beth Ross, supra note 30.
159. Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2007).
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1. FEDEX’S INDUSTRY DISRUPTION: DEREGULATION AND
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTING
As scholars have shown, FedEx is a “well-known corporate
success story,”160 netting billions of dollars within a few years of its
founding. FedEx first became a leading player in the air-cargo delivery
business, which, prior to FedEx’s work to deregulate the industry, had
been highly regulated and unprofitable. In pushing for and establishing
a favorable regulatory environment, within ten years, FedEx became
more profitable than its larger and older competitor: UPS.161 In 2000,
when FedEx entered the market for ground delivery, the company once
again took its competitors by storm, employing an independent
contractor business model, growing rapidly, and usurping nearly fifty
percent of the market within a decade.162
FedEx’s success has largely been attributed to its political
participation in a series of major regulatory reforms.163 Over many
decades, FedEx leveraged its significant power in the form of both
political and structural capital to achieve a regulatory environment
favorable to the company’s visions. For example, the federal act
liberalizing the air cargo industry—passed in 1977—was commonly
referred to in Congress as “The Federal Express Act” and principally
designed to benefit FedEx.164 The deregulation of inter- and intrastate
trucking in the 1980s and 1990s, via the Motor Carrier Act of 1980165
and the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act in 1995,166

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Fisch, supra note 157, at 1503.
Id.
Interview with Beth Ross, supra note 30.
Fisch, supra note 157, at 1503.
Id. at 1514–15
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980:

[F]ormally beg[an] the era of [trucking] economic deregulation. The new
rules allowed free entry into the market, eliminated indirect routings
designed to protect carriers from competition, sharply limited collective
rate-making[,] . . . and allowed carriers to discharge discriminatory prices
(discount pricing to high-volume customers). For the first time,
compensatory rates—rather that would cover the cost of service—were not
required; rates could be lower than the fully distributed cost of hauling the
freight.
MICHAEL H. BELZER, SWEATSHOPS ON WHEELS: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN TRUCKING
DEREGULATION 29 (2000).
166. Fisch, supra note 157, at 1518–22. After the deregulation of the trucking
industry, between 1977 and 1995, real wages dropped by thirty percent for the average
truck driver. BELZER, supra note 165, at 21. Notably, Congress mandated intrastate
economic deregulation as a rider to the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] Bill of
1995. Id. “This . . . developed out of dispute between competitors UPS and Federal
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was also in large part the result of FedEx’s industry disruption and
political mobilization efforts, well detailed in Jill Fisch’s 2005 study of
the company.167
For this case study, I look at FedEx’s expansion into ground
transportation and its practice of using independent contractor truck
drivers. In 2000, FedEx purchased and grew a company—Roadway
Package Systems (RPS)—that had, since 1985, also utilized a business
model built on deregulation.168 For fifteen years, RPS had groundshipped packages with a workforce of independent contractor drivers.169
Although RPS has faced years of costly misclassification litigation,
upon purchase, FedEx chose to adopt an independent contractor model
and expand it.
In RPS, FedEx found a kindred business spirit. Several RPS
founders were former UPS managers “who were confident they could
successfully compete with UPS with innovative business methods and
an entirely different business model.”170 To compete against UPS—
whose workers are represented by Teamsters—RPS cut their labor
costs, thus enabling them to lower their shipping prices. Instead of
investing in a workforce—purchasing a fleet of delivery trucks, hiring
mechanics to maintain those trucks, and employing truck drivers—RPS
foisted all of those responsibilities onto independent contractors.171
Meanwhile, these “small business owners” were promised the freedom
and flexibility of operating their “own businesses.”172 Just as today’s
on-demand labor platform companies claim to merely be “tech
companies” that cyber coordinate workers and consumers, RPS—and

Express that came to a head in California.” Id. at 65. FedEx, which again was
originally an air taxi carrier, transformed itself into a general freight carrier to avoid
being covered by the Motor Carrier Act. UPS, by contrast, was classified as a motor
carrier. Thus, FedEx and UPS—though doing the same thing—were operating under
very different rules in California. FedEx was free to change intrastate rates while
UPUS was regulated by the state public utilities commission and had to apply for rate
changes. The dispute was litigated, and FedEx won. To address the inequities in
regulation, Congress chose deregulation over re-regulation. Id at 65–66.
167. Fisch, supra note 157, at 1519–20.
168. FedEx
Ground,
FEDEX,
HISTORY
AND
TIMELINE,
http://about.van.fedex.com/our-story/history-timeline/history/opco-ground/
[https://perma.cc/V2BY-5YPY].
169. Id.
170. Beth Ross & Estelle Pae, A Brief History: In re FedEx Ground Package
Systems, Inc. Employment Practices Litigation, MDL No. 1700, Case No. 3:05-md-527
RM,
ABA
LABOR
AND
EMPLOYMENT
SECTION
585,
586
(2011),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/laborlaw/meetings/2011/
eeo/030.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/R23L-UUXG].
171. Id.
172. Id.
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later FedEx—claimed to not be an employer, but a conduit between
those who wanted to ship and those who could make the delivery.
RPS did eventually gain a competitive advantage over UPS by
eliminating from its operating budget employment taxes, workers’
compensation liability, and the costs and liabilities associated with
owning and operating a fleet.173 Still, to build their brand, the company
needed to exert some control over their workers—especially with regard
to the appearance of both their trucks and their drivers. The RPS
drivers were required to sign Operating Agreements which obligated
them to purchase or lease trucks through a specific company—Bush
Leasing—and “to pay all expenses associated with operating that
equipment and performing their assigned work duties.”174 RPS assigned
to each driver a geographically defined service route “to which,
according to [the] Operating Agreement, they had a proprietary
interest.”175 RPS, however, exerted substantial control over how that
proprietary right could be exercised.176 177
The artful crafting of their truck drivers as independent contractors
led to many legal challenges. RPS’s independent contractor business
model was first challenged by the Teamsters in the late 1980s.178 In
1988, the NLRB decided that since RPS required their drivers to lease
their trucks from a particular vendor (Bush Leasing), the company
exerted enough control over their workers to consider them employees
for purposes of collective bargaining.179 The IRS went after the
company after realizing they could get back-taxes for
misclassification.180 In 1994, RPS re-wrote their contract, allowing
Bush Leasing to fall out of the contract, and including language to the
effect of “no one can tell you when to take your break or how to
conduct your business.”181 RPS paid 25 million dollars for a letter of

173. Id.
174. Id. at 586.
175. Id.
176. Id. For example, the contract specified that RPS could, among other
things, “reconfigure the geographic boundaries of any route . . . reassign stops and
accounts . . . . grant or deny approval to a proposed transfer or sale of the route . . . .
[and mandate] pick-up and delivery [of] any work assignments.” Id. at 587.
177. Interview with Beth Ross, supra note 30; Dubal, Wage Slave or
Entrepreneur?, supra note 2, at 77 n.32 (quoting Rev. Rul. 87–41, 1987–1 C.B. 296
(1987)).
178. Roadway Package Sys. Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 196, 196 (1988).
179. Id at 199.
180. Ross & Pae, supra note 170, at 588.
181. Interview with Beth Ross, supra note 30.

784

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

assurance from the IRS saying that under the 1994 contract, RPS truck
drivers were independent contractors under tax laws.182
After FedEx purchased RPS in 1998, it launched FedEx Home
Delivery, a business-to-consumer service.183 In operating the company
as a turnkey operation, FedEx inherited both the business model and
the company’s legal troubles.184 Over the next two decades, FedEx
“steadfastly stood by and defended the independent contractor model in
every conceivable state and federal legal forum, including a group of
class action cases filed between 2004 and 2009, asserting various
statutory and common law claims under the laws of over 40 states as
well as federal claims arising under the FLSA [Fair Labor Standards
Act], ERISA [Employee Retirement Income Security Act], and the
FMLA [Family and Medical Leave Act].”185 This litigation and
FedEx’s commitment to operating in a deregulated and de-unionized

182. Id.
183. FedEx Ground, supra note 168.
184. Ross & Pae, supra note 170, at 587–88. Because FedEx entered the cargo
transportation industry in the 1970s as an air carrier and not a ground carrier, “it took
advantage of its status as an air carrier for purposes of labor regulations.” Fisch, supra
note 157, at 1538. In the mid-1970s, FedEx established through a series of judicial and
administrative agency decisions that it was subject to the Railway Labor Act (RLA) and
not the National Labor Relations Act (NRLA), which governed the labor activities of
workers at other cargo companies, including FedEx’s main competitor, UPS. Id. at
1539. The RLA is much less labor-friendly than the NLRA. Centrally, under the RLA,
unions must organize employees of a company on a national level, not on a local level.
Understandably, this greatly hindered attempts to unionize FedEx workers. They
wanted to make sure that their ground business would not mix with FedEx Express
because the presence of ground operations would have unprotected the company from
the RLA. Thus, they bought RPS and operated it as a turnkey operation. Unlike other
Fed-Ex couriers, then, Fed-Ex ground workers operate as independent contractors that
spell out a type of piece-rate compensation from the company.
185. Ross & Pae, supra note 170, at 588. According to lead attorneys Beth
Ross and Ellen Pae:
There are dozens and dozens of summary administrative decisions from all
over the country passing on the employment status of individual workers. In
addition, there have been a significant number of State Attorney General
actions filed challenging the FedEx system . . . . The IRS opened a new
investigation into the . . . FedEx system in which the IRS issued Notices of
Proposed Assessment in 2007 and 2009 premised on the view that the
FedEx drivers were employees under the common law agency test.
Administrative actions have also been initiated against FedEx for various
tax years by a number of state tax agencies including but not limited to
California resulting in administrative decisions adverse to FedEx that are
believed to have been settled as well.
Id. at 588 n.2.
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workplace led them to pay over one billion dollars of litigation costs
(including settlements) by 2016.186
2. IN THE DRIVER’S SEAT: BEING A FEDEX INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR
The independent contractor business no doubt enabled FedEx’s
successful and growing share in the ground delivery service market.
But the implications for workers were less positive. Many drivers who
began working for FedEx during this time did not understand what it
meant to be an independent contractor when they purchased and worked
a FedEx route. As Dale Rose, a named plaintiff in two important
misclassification cases against FedEx, told me:
I didn’t have a firm grasp of the difference between an
independent contractor and an employee. I bought what they
[FedEx] sold. They said, “This is your potential income.”
They sold that to me really hard. They sold it as “You have
control over your life; it’s your truck; it’s your business, and
you’ll have a lot of control.” Which obviously I didn’t want
to turn away.187
Like the taxi worker plaintiffs in Tracy and Friendly Cab, control
over their work lives was enticing to many FedEx drivers. The idea
that they could be small business people—growing their own company,
not having a boss on their back, and having the freedom to take time
off to care for family—these were reasons that many workers, including
Rose, were attracted to FedEx.
But soon after investing tens of thousands of dollars in a truck and
a route, many drivers discovered that this “control” was illusory.
Plaintiff-worker Marjorie Pontarolo, for example, bought a truck and a
route from FedEx in 1999, just a year after the company was purchased
from RPS. Reflecting on those early years driving and delivering for
FedEx, Pontarolo said:
They called us independent contractors, but basically, they
controlled us. They told us what uniforms to wear, what times

186. Daniel Weissner, FedEx to Settle Driver Lawsuit in 20 States for $240
Million, REUTERS (June 16, 2016, 12:50PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usfedex-settlement/fedex-to-settle-driver-lawsuits-in-20-states-for-240-millionidUSKCN0Z229Q [https://perma.cc/D4Q5-G2A7].
187. Telephone Interview with Dale Rose, Former FedEx Truck Driver (May
9, 2017).
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we could be at certain places. . . . As the years progressed,
they really started tightening down, “You can’t wear black
socks, you have to wear white socks, you can’t do this and
you can do this.” And they really started tightening down on
different parts of the job: what to do, where to be, how to do
it, how to dress, when you could leave, when you could come
back. . . . If you made mistakes, for example, or had an
accident or if you missed your pick up, what they started
doing was charging you.188

Drivers like Rose and Pontarolo were disgruntled—and looking for
solutions to their grievances against FedEx. Rose formed an informal
group among contractors in his terminal in Southern California. Drivers
met at each other’s homes, and for months, discussed their on-the-job
complaints. Rose recalled:
We talked about what’s frustrating and about what FedEx
really needed to address and we put it down on paper and
presented it to higher management. . . . He pretended to take
us serious, but no actions were taken over those several
months. And I think the people in our group were frustrated.
Or they were afraid they were going to be retaliated against,
and some kind of were. We tried, but we disbanded.189
His problems unsolved, Rose went online, and like many atomized
workers with collective action problems do, he looked to lawyers. Rose
happened upon a website of a law firm looking for plaintiffs to sue
FedEx for misclassification, and he signed up.
However, the goals of the litigation that Rose and other FedEx
drivers joined as plaintiffs did not reflect their desires. Rose did not
want employee status. His goal was to remain an independent
contractor but with “better pay and less control.”190 Rose told me, “I
wanted to be a contractor who was able to provide his employees a
decent living wage, especially for the state of California.”191 Pontarolo,
too, articulated how she had hoped that the litigation would bring her
the dignity and freedom that she lacked at work. But she wanted to
maintain her status as an independent contractor and force FedEx to
treat her like a real businessperson. Pontarolo said:

188. Telephone Interview with Marjorie Pontarolo, Former FedEx Truck
Driver (May 8, 2017).
189. Interview with Dale Rose, supra note 187.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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I was hoping that FedEx would treat us like real independent
contractors as opposed to treating us like employees because
everything fell on us. Anytime there was a mistake or if a
package wasn’t delivered, they would bring us in for what
they called a business meeting and write us up . . . and then
they’d charge for the accident. It got to the point where it is
was $500 a month for three months for one accident. I wanted
them to back off and let us be real contractors. . . . The
people that went out there and delivered the packages and did
all the hard work and serviced their vehicles—dependable
people out there doing a good job made FedEx what they are
today. FedEx Ground didn’t make themselves. We did it, and
it was upsetting to see them treating everyone like they did. I
think if you’re going to have somebody as an independent
contractor, then treat them like an independent contractor and
let them do their job.192
Though many drivers stayed in the shadows, fearful of retaliation,
driver plaintiffs like Pontarolo and Rose stepped forward, and with the
help and dedication of skilled plaintiffs’ attorneys, used
misclassification litigation to challenge the degree of control exerted
over their work lives. Importantly, however, because of the constraints
of work law and the independent contractor-employee dichotomy, the
misclassification litigation did not accurately capture their self-visions.
They did not want a court to find them to be misclassified employees,
rather, they wanted legal recognition of their status as mistreated
independent contractors.
3. ESTRADA & ALEXANDER: WHEN WORKERS WIN IN COURT
By the early 2000s, plaintiffs’ attorneys across the United States
were considering misclassification litigation against FedEx under wagerelated state laws. The test for employee status varies from statute to
statute with some state laws offering more expansive definitions of
employment. This multi-state litigation, attorneys postulated, would
force FedEx to change their business model nationwide and assume
some of the traditional risk associated with employing so many
workers.
The first of the court cases to go to trial was Estrada v. FedEx
Ground Package Systems, Inc.,193 which had been filed in 2000, just
192. Interview with Marjorie Pontarolo, supra note 188.
193. Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2007).
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two years after FedEx purchased RPS.194 The plaintiffs’ primary claim
in Estrada was for reimbursement of employment-related expenses
under California Labor Code § 2802.195 Over the course of nine years
of complex litigation, a large class of workers was certified, and the
drivers were held to be employees under the California Borello
standard—the same test for employee status used in the Tracy,
decision.196 Substantial damages were awarded to each class member.197
Though FedEx appealed the decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the trial court’s finding, pointing to the Operating Agreement which the
drivers had to sign, the FedEx “Ground Manual,” and the “Operations
Management Handbook.”198 The appellate decision delineated the many
ways in which the drivers are “totally integrated into the [FedEx]
operation,” including “that they perform work essential to FedEx’s
core business, that they are required to work exclusively and full-time
for FedEx, that their customers are those assigned to them by FedEx,
that no specialized skills are required, that they must wear uniforms and
conform absolutely to FedEx’s standards and that, in the end, each
driver has a ‘job’ with ‘little or no entrepreneurial opportunities.”199
The court took special note of the fact that FedEx controlled “every
exquisite detail of the drivers’ performance, including the color of their
socks and the style of their hair.”200 In finding the single work area
drivers to be employees for reimbursement purposes (excluding the cost
of their vehicles), the trial court wrote, “[I]f it looks like a duck, walks
like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a duck.”201
While Estrada was still winding its way through the court system,
over forty more misclassification class actions cases were filed by
plaintiffs’ attorneys on behalf of FedEx drivers under state laws all over
the country.202 All the class action lawsuits posed the identical legal
question: are FedEx ground drivers employees, or are they independent
contractors? Although virtually all the cases plead state law violations,
at FedEx’s behest, these cases were consolidated into a multi-district

194. Ross & Pae, supra note 170, at 588.
195. California Labor Code Section 2802 delineates the obligations of
employers in indemnifying employees for expenses related to employment and calls for
penalties and citations for those who violate the terms of the statute. Cal. Lab. Code §
2802.
196. For a discussion of the Borello standard see supra note 95.
197. Ross & Pae, supra note 170, at 589; Estrada, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 335–36.
198. Estrada, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 331–33.
199. Id. at 334.
200. Id. at 336.
201. Id. at 335, 347.
202. Ross & Pae, supra note 170, at 589.
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litigation docket and all pretrial proceedings were put before a judge in
the Northern District of Indiana.203
When Estrada was decided, many commentators understood it as
having a potentially far-reaching consequence for FedEx drivers, but
instead of abiding by the spirit of the decision and paying their drivers
as employees, FedEx responded to Estrada by eliminating their singleroute contracts.204 In late 2007, the company shifted all their California
work to the “multi-work area” business model.205 Many single-route
drivers were forced to purchase other routes and more than 1,000
single route drivers were not renewed.206 FedEx acknowledged that this
action was taken in response to the Estrada decision.207
How did this change impact the plaintiffs? As one of the attorneys
for the plaintiffs said, “a lot [of drivers] lost their jobs, which I feel
extremely guilty about.”208 Pontarolo reflected:
After Estrada, you had to have multiple work areas . . . the
stress factor went up and it made it harder. Over a period of
time, it just kept getting worse and worse. . . . Everything
that FedEx was doing to cover themselves against any of us
being employees made our lives very hard. Everything was at
our expense. They didn’t care. It was like, ‘You need to go
out and service your area, and we don’t care if you take lunch
breaks, we don’t care what you have to do to do it.’ 209
Thus, while FedEx did treat their workers more like independent
contractors, as many drivers had hoped, how they made this change
was surprising and challenging for both workers and their attorneys. In
addition to many drivers losing their jobs, the ones who remained on
the job suffered from a new host of problems.
Frustrated by the outcome, once FedEx shifted to the “multi-work
area” business model in California, the Estrada attorneys sued again
under California law. Alexander v. FedEx was filed and integrated into
the multi-district litigation.210 The plaintiffs’ attorneys, led by Beth
Ross, represented 2,300 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers
203. Id.
204. Todd D. Saveland, FedEx’s New “Employees”: Their Disgruntled
Independent Contractors, 36 TRANSP. L. J. 95, 113 (2009).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Interview with Beth Ross, supra note 30.
209. Interview with Marjorie Pontarolo, supra note 188.
210. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 987 (9th
Cir. 2014).
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in California between 2000 and 2007.211 These drivers worked for both
FedEx Ground and FedEx Home Delivery.212 While the multi-district
litigation court in Indiana granted summary judgment to FedEx, on
review, the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted summary judgment to
the plaintiffs, finding all the necessary indicia of employee status.213
4. EVADING ALEXANDER: THE RESTRUCTURING OF FEDEX AND THE
INDEPENDENT SERVICE PROVIDERS AGREEMENT
Despite the tremendous class action wins in Alexander and
Estrada, FedEx ultimately evaded treating their ground drivers as
employees. In response to Alexander and in recognition of the twelve
states around the country that use a modified test to determine
employee status in which the question of employee status turns on
whether workers perform work that is a core component of the
principal’s business, FedEx changed to an independent service provider
(ISP) model.214 Under the ISP model, drivers are required to cover five
service areas.215 According to Beth Ross, the plaintiffs’ lead attorney in
Alexander, many of the ISP contractors do not drive and instead spend
all of their time managing these routes. In addition to foisting the risk
and responsibilities of business onto these “small businesses,” the ISP
model also gives FedEx an additional level of protection against
unionization.216
Strikingly, the financial conditions of the ISP drivers are more
precarious than they were before the Alexander litigation. As small
business people, they are not properly remunerated for their work, nor
are they able to provide secure employment for those who they hire.
After spending a substantial portion of her career working on Alexander
211. Id. at 984.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. The Seventh Circuit Holds That FedEx Delivery Drivers Are Employees,
and Not Independent Contractors, of FedEx, SWARTZ SWIDLER, LLC (July 10, 2015),
http://swartz-legal.com/the-seventh-circuit-holds-that-fedex-delivery-drivers-areemployees-and-not-independent-contractors-of-fedex [https://perma.cc/JW53-QVL7].
215. FedEx Ground Announces ISP Transition by 2020, CAPITAL ROUTE SALES
(Jan. 29, 2016), https://capitalroutesales.com/fedex-ground-announces-isp-transitionby-2020 [https://perma.cc/87MX-4XUS].
216. Lydia DePillis, How FedEx is Trying to Save the Business Model That
Saved
It
Millions,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
23,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/10/23/how-fedex-is-tryingto-save-the-business-model-that-saved-it-millions
[https://perma.cc/M46U-R3AX].
Some drivers are considering suing FedEx under a joint-employer theory, but that will
implicate many of the plaintiffs in Alexander Torres v. Air to Ground Services, Inc.,
300 F.R.D. 386, 391–393 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
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and the multi-state misclassification litigation against FedEx, Ross
reflected on the outcome:
Drivers [post-Alexander] have little control over how they
order their affairs. FedEx leaves them alone more than they
used to, but they have a terrible financial problem. FedEx
doesn’t pay them enough to really compensate the people who
drive for them. A lot of them do not provide workers’
compensation or provide overtime. One plaintiff from
Alexander, for example, has nine drivers and four of them are
on public benefits. And not because he doesn’t pay them
every penny he can. He does not even have health insurance
for himself and his family.217
Both Pontarolo and Rose confirmed Ross’s observations and explained
that drivers’ work lives became more precarious after the decision in
Alexander and FedEx’s subsequent business model changes. Pontarolo
decided to sell her route and trucks. She told me about the ISP model:
Things got worse when they brought in the ISP program.
Basically, they thought, “how are we going to cover our
behinds” and they made everyone have a huge work area. . . .
And [so] you had to buy more service areas. They didn’t want
people partnering up with other people. Basically, you had to
sell out or you had to sell to somebody that would keep you as
an employee under them. . . . I ended up selling out in
March. I wasn’t going to deal with five trucks, five drivers,
five times the insurance, five times the liability. But I lost
money on both my routes. We lost $50,000 per route. And
they promised all the guys [who participated in the ISP], “Oh
you’ll make a million plus dollars a year with this new [ISP]
contract.” But the people that I know who stayed say that it’s
just horrible. Horrible. I see the trucks on the road and I just
shake my head and think, “you guys are getting so
screwed.”218
Unlike Pontarolo, Rose attempted to continue working with FedEx after
the ISP model was implemented. He signed an ISP contract and
experienced what it was like to manage and pay a team of nine drivers.
When I asked how he managed and whether he had been able to pay the
drivers who worked for him, he lamented:
217.
218.

Interview with Beth Ross, supra note 30.
Interview with Marjorie Pontarolo, supra note 188.
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I gave them all that I could, but it wasn’t enough. I had no
profit at the end of the year, let’s put it that way. I was
actually losing a little bit of money each year. I couldn’t offer
them decent benefits . . . FedEx just doesn’t pay enough. And
I worked six days a week—all the time. My phone was never
off; I did so much management work. It was a lot of stress,
and I never made more than $54,000 a year. That was the
most I ever made.219

Overwhelmed, underpaid, and stressed, Rose, too, decided to sell his
routes and his trucks.
Worker plaintiffs were not the only ones disappointed by the
outcome. I spoke with another prominent plaintiff’s attorney who
worked on the FedEx cases. Dmitri Igzitlan, who helped to craft a
Seattle ordinance to give independent contractor gig workers the right
to collectively bargain, told me that in drafting the legislation, he was
drawing on the real-life failures and unexpected impacts of the
misclassification litigation against FedEx. Igzitlan lamented, “I worked
on FedEx for nine long years of my life, but I am not seeing the kinds
of results that I had hoped. So, I am moving in another direction.”220
III.

LESSONS ON THE ROLE OF MISCLASSIFICATION LITIGATION ON
WORKERS IN THE GIG ECONOMY

In 1974, largely responding to the failure of Brown v. Board to desegregate public schools, Stuart Scheingold famously argued:
[T]he . . . direct deployment of legal rights in the
implementation of public policy will not work very well,
given any significant opposition. Litigation may be helpful to
individuals who have the resources and determination to
pursue remedies through the court system. But courts cannot
be relied upon to secure rights more generally . . . .221
Following Scheingold’s excoriation of rights as “myths,” law and
society scholars engaged in a dynamic debate about the relative
constraints of courts in enacting social change. For some, most
famously Gerald Rosenberg, litigation was a “hollow hope,” while for

219. Interview with Dale Rose, supra note 187.
220. Dmitri Iglitzin, Partner, Schwerin, Campbell, Barnard, Iglitzin & Lavitt,
LLP, Panel at the Berkley Journal of Employment and Labor Law Symposium:
Organizing Workers (Feb. 26, 2016).
221. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 26, at 117.

2017:739

Winning the Battle, Losing the War?

793

others, including Michael McCann, litigation had the potential—in
symbolic and strategic ways—to enact social change.222 In more recent
years, social movement scholars in both political science and sociology
have built on these arguments to examine—often through specific case
studies—the internal and external effects of litigation. My examination
of Tracy, Friendly Cab, and Alexander contributes to this conversation,
utilizing both positivist and interpretivist understandings of the role of
litigation in effecting social. Like Scheingold and Rosenberg, I identify
reasons why litigation victories have not been successful in securing
employee rights for workers. But following in the footsteps of Michael
McCann, I am also interested in what symbolic and strategic impacts
the litigation had, particularly on plaintiff-workers. How did the drivers
in each case study make sense of the role of the litigation in their lives?
Workers won the litigation battle, but lost the larger war for
economic justice. In all three of the case studies, employee rights laws
remained unenforced. These stories are important to be read and
understood together: not only because they litigated different types of
employment rights (safety-net rights, collective bargaining rights, and
rights to wage security), but also because the long-term, on-the-ground
outcome of each case study reflected a different type of risk in relying
upon litigation to enforce change for workers in the gig economy.
Scholars have long opined on the weak enforcement power of the
judiciary to enforce social change. But in this section, I extrapolate two
further lessons from the real-life failures of these litigation victories that
are specific to the gig economy. First, the structural and political
capital of many gig firms renders impotent the private enforcement of
individual employee rights. And second, employee status may not be
well-suited to the desires and goals of gig workers.
A. The Structural and Political Capital of Firms
As Scheingold first noted six decades ago, the “practical impact
[of a litigation victory] . . . is restricted by post-judgment power

222. See generally, GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT
WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994). For an
interesting conversation on the role of litigation in social change between Gerald
Rosenberg, Malcolm Feeley, and Michael McCann see the symposium issue of LAW
AND SOCIAL INQUIRY from 1992. Malcom M. Feeley, Hollow Hopes, Flypaper, and
Metaphors, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 745 (1992); Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation
on Trial, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 715 (1992); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hopes and
Other Aspirations: A Reply to Feeley and McCann, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 761 (1992).
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relationships.”223 In the employee rights context, this is not only
because of the fragmented nature of judicial enforcement,224 as has been
much noted, but also because of the relative structural and political
imbalances outside the courtroom. The first lesson from these case
studies, then, is not surprising: the legal recognition of employee rights
does not have a redistributive effect on power between the workerplaintiffs and the firm-defendants.
Outside the courtroom, plaintiffs in each case study continued to
lack the structural capital of the companies that they were challenging.
In Tracy, the implication of this was quite clear: workers were afraid of
galvanizing their individual rights. In Friendly Cab, too, the fact that
the companies could leverage expensive, aggressive lawyering to slow
down the litigation discouraged worker-plaintiffs and enervated longterm mobilization. The taxi company’s successful refusal to come to the
bargaining table was itself a clear demonstration of their relative
structural power.
Beyond the obvious resource imbalance and the fact that it was not
remedied by litigation, legally-imposed inequalities also contributed to
the relative structural power of these firms to impede employee rights
from being realized. For example, in Alexander, enforcement of rights
was circumvented by a business restructuring endorsed by legal
decisions. Corporate evasion of employment and labor laws through
reorganization has long been sanctioned by courts. When companies
began to use independent contractor labor in the 1970s to de-unionize
their workforce, federal appellate courts found that such re-organization
was the prerogative of capital and not subjective to collective
bargaining.225 The legal entitlement of firms to restructure their
business model undermines any redistributive power enabled by a
judicial finding of employee status. Perhaps Alexander best exemplifies
223. Id.
224. Id. at 118–20.
225. Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.,
603 F.2d 862, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing
Committee v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit famously held that the taxi companies’ decision
to use the leasing practice to convert their workers to independent contractors was not
an unfair labor practice. The court wrote:
The fact that an employer’s decision affects conditions of employment does
not necessarily imply . . . that it is a mandatory subject of bargaining . . .
the decision to lease did not merely change the identity of the persons
employed, but rather the entire basis of the companies’ income.
Id. at 883–84. Thus, as I explain in detail elsewhere, even though the companies had
pre-meditatively advanced plans to make their workers independent contractors in order
to evade work laws, “the court found that the switch of worker identity was within the
realm of the business prerogative . . . .” Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?, supra
note 2, at 91.
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the power of contemporary gig firms to reconstitute themselves in the
face of misclassification victories.
This lesson about the relative structural power of firms is also
important to consider when assessing legislative approaches to address
the grievances gig workers. For example, many contemporary
academic and advocacy discussions on legislative solutions to worker
precarity in the platform-enabled gig economy revolve around either
expanding the definition of employee,226 or creating a new category of
worker status227 (e.g. dependent contractor). But the outcome of the
Alexander case study suggests that such popular policy strategies may
be ineffective. Legally redefining who benefits from state protections
does not address the power of firms to choose how to structure their
workforce. As Noah Zatz aptly argues, “[T]weaking the line between
[who is a protected worker and who is not] . . . seems doomed to
intervene too late in a process that employers control from the outset,
one that they control with at least one eye on the labor [and
employment law] consequences.”228
In addition to their structural power, the firms in these case studies
were emboldened by their significant political capital. Though city
regulators had the power to sanction taxicab companies for noncompliance in Tracy, they never did, despite worker advocacy to this
end. My interviews with both drivers and former city officials suggest
that the owners of Friendly Cab wielded the power of their political
relationships to maintain their hold of medallions—even those that were
unused—essentially forcing the EBDA to choose misclassification
litigation over regulatory advocacy to achieve self-ownership. As Jill
Fisch has shown with her comprehensive study of FedEx’s political
activities, FedEx’s corporate success is in large part a result of their
political strategies, leveraging political participation to create a
regulatory environment suitable to their ambitions and visions.229
Fisch’s study underscores that when court decisions or a regulatory
regime does not favor them, well-financed firms like FedEx turn to
elected bodies—not just to evade laws but also to re-shape them to their
liking. In the more recent gig economy, both Uber and Lyft have had
great success at quietly but proactively using their political power to get
226. Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent
Contractor Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279,
280–82 (2011).
227. Id. at 284. For an excellent comparative analysis of the problems posed by
such hybrid categories across national settings see Miram A. Cherry & Antonio Aliosi,
“Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66 AM.
UNIV. L. REV. 635, 637 (2017).
228
Zatz, supra note 226, at 289.
229. Fisch, supra note 157, at 1511.
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state legislation passed which codifies the status of their drivers as
independent contractors.
B. Worker Ambivalence Towards Employee Status
The second, less obvious lesson from these case studies is an
interpretive one, gleaned from the narratives of plaintiff workers in
each case. In other work, I have shown how the duality of legal worker
status has had a fractitious impact on worker organizing. In an
ethnography of taxi workers in San Francisco, I found that some
drivers wanted to be employees, while others valued their independent
contractor status. This, I illustrated, became a point of contention and
division during efforts towards collective mobilization. But in the case
studies here—specifically in Friendly Cab and Alexander—the issue of
employee status did not necessarily divide workers. Rather, workerplaintiffs who were fighting for employee status were themselves—from
the very beginning—surprisingly ambivalent toward it. This finding
highlights the degree to which misclassification litigation may be illsuited to the desires and visions of some workers operating in a “grey
zone.”
What did worker-plaintiffs want in these misclassification case
studies, if not employee status? Both the Friendly Cab and the FedEx
driver plaintiffs said they were attracted to the relative structural
control enabled by independent contracting. Dale Rose, for example,
explained that he joined FedEx because he wanted the flexibility
enabled by self-management:
I wanted to be an entrepreneur, and I wanted to be selfemployed. I wanted to manage my own schedule and to have
some flexibility so that when things come up with the kids I
c[ould] stop what I was doing to take care of that issue. I
wanted the control, but that didn’t happen with FedEx. And it
didn’t happen after Alexander.230
Anwar Zadran and Marjorie Pontarolo pointed to similar reasons
for joining the taxi and trucking industries, respectively. In each case,
these workers were motivated to participate as plaintiffs in
misclassification litigation not because they pined for employee status,
but because they resented the degree to which the companies exerted
control and interfered in their everyday work lives. In each case,
workers complained about arbitrary discipline and stringent rules on
behavior, dress, and deliverables. For them, participating in the
230.

Interview with Dale Rose, supra note 187.
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lawsuits was valuable as an act of resistance, not necessarily as a means
to gain certain employee protections.
In the case of FedEx, worker plaintiffs explained that they
participated in the litigation to force the company to exert less control
and to treat them more like they envisioned contractors should be
treated. In the aftermath of Estrada and Alexander, workers got some
independence, but only in exchange for an undesirable increase in risk.
After FedEx moved to a multi-route business model following Estrada,
Pontarolo reflected on how the changes she experienced negatively
impacted her work life. She had wanted FedEx to stop interfering in
her day-to-day work life—to stop telling her what to wear and
disciplining her for not doing her work exactly as they wanted. But the
way in which FedEx responded exacerbated her troubles. She told me:
I mean, after Estrada, I actually injured myself one time
taking a hundred-fifty-pound package upstairs. I pulled my
arm out of my socket, and I told my manager, “What do I do
in a situation like that?” His comment back to me was, “You
need to service the customer, and if means getting that
package up to their front door, then you have to do it.” They
didn’t care if you hurt yourself. And they would still fine you
if you complained!231
In other words, while Pontarolo wanted to be treated more
independently, the ways in which she and FedEx envisioned that
independence were dramatically different. Pontarolo continued to want
the support that came from working at a large corporation. After being
injured, she saw an easy solution: FedEx could temporarily give her
work to someone else. But to FedEx, such a reassignment was
emblematic of employee status. She was told to deal with her problems
independently, perhaps so that she would look more like a contractor,
bearing the risk and losses associated with injury. To make things
worse, in addition to having to bear this responsibility, Pontarolo
remained subject to the whimsical disciplinary regime of managers,
neither free to complain nor to ask for support.
Rose acknowledged that FedEx’s post-Alexander restructuring did
leave workers with more freedom from the everyday control exerted by
the company than he had experienced after Estrada, but he bemoaned
the remunerative realities of that independence. Rose said:
I feel bad for the drivers now. A lot of the drivers like the
work. It gives them freedom; they don’t have a supervisor
231.

Interview with Marjorie Pontarolo, supra note 188.
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looking over their shoulder every hour of the day. But it’s the
compensation. They’re driving, and they see an experienced
UPS driver who is probably receiving $120,000 overall
compensation a year, including benefits and retirement.
Versus an average driver at FedEx right now is probably
making $40,000 a year with very few benefits.232

Thus, to some extent, the litigation left Rose and his colleagues
with the physical freedom they wanted, but the structure of the
company severely limited the pecuniary possibilities of their work. Not
only were their earnings one-third that of unionized truck drivers, but
they also bore the additional stresses of managing and not being able to
adequately pay their own employees. This latter impact drove Rose
from the business altogether.
In the case of Friendly Cab, worker ambivalence towards potential
employee status worked slightly differently. In Friendly Cab, the
misclassification litigation derailed the workers’ primary goal of
cooperative self-ownership. When the Teamsters took up their cause,
they made the understandable decision to discourage workers from
becoming small business owners. “That wasn’t our goal,” said the
Teamsters’ business manager.233 The union, their attorneys, and even
the city regulators instead endorsed the path most familiar to them:
employee status. In theory, achieving collective bargaining rights for
the drivers would give the union new members, give their attorneys the
opportunity to advance good “worker-friendly” law, and make the job
of city regulators in dealing with the taxi company much easier. But the
many years of intense intransigence and hard-fought litigation on the
part of the taxi companies enervated worker desires to mobilize through
collective power. In reflecting on the case, Caren Sencer, the attorney
who argued Friendly Cab on behalf of the East Bay Drivers’
Association before the Ninth Circuit, lamented, “[T]he biggest
problem, I think, was that the drivers did not want to be employees.”234
Workers pushed for employee status as a way to hold the company
accountable and to potentially improve their work lives. But it was a
second-best goal for them. What they wanted was shared selfownership—a progressive vision that no one helped them to achieve.
Nevertheless, across the three case studies, how workers
conceptualized the role of the litigation in their lives varied. The
plaintiff-workers from Alexander found the litigation process
232. Interview with Dale Rose, supra note 187.
233. Interview with Bob Aiello, supra note 139.
234. Interview with Caren Senser, Attorney and Shareholder, Weinberg,
Roger, and Rosenfeld, Alameda, Cal. (June 23, 2017).
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empowering because it gave them the opportunity to air their
grievances and to hold the company financially accountable in a limited
sense. Pontarolo said:
I would do it all over again just to show FedEx that they can’t
do that to us little guys that make them what they are, that
was the thing that I was so—excuse my French—but so pissed
off about at the time was we made them what they were and
are today.235
Rose, too, called the attorneys who litigated the cases his “heroes” and
marveled at the litigation win, “I mean it was the biggest settlement in
history with a case like this and that was satisfaction.”236
In contrast, the EBDA drivers from Friendly Cab were resentful at
having spent years trying to get the right to collectively bargain.
Having lost their jobs in the litigation process, many of these drivers
were left with no other options to support themselves or their families.
The financial desperation they found themselves in made them wonder
what would have happened if they could have just gotten a hold of a
few medallions instead of nearly a decade resisting their employer.
Some looked back at the hard work of the Teamsters and believed that
the union had deradicalized the objectives of their grassroots
movement, only to abandon them later. Zadran lamented, “We did all
of that . . . for what?” 237
Joe Tracy fell somewhere in between these two extremes. He had
a great deal of respect for the attorneys who represented him and the
class he represented. But he was exhausted and left worker organizing
more generally. He said, “I did my part.” 238

235.
236.
237.
238.

Interview with Marjorie Pontarolo, supra note 188.
Interview with Dale Rose, supra note 187.
Interview with Anwar Zadran, supra note 130.
Interview with Joe Tracy, supra note 109.
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Figure 1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM MISCLASSIFICATION
LITIGATION CASE STUDIES
EMPLOYEE RIGHT
WON VIA
LITIGATION
Workers’
Compensation

Tracy v. Yellow Cab
Unemployment
Insurance
Friendly v. NLRB

Collective
Bargaining

Alexander v. FedEx

Wage Security

EMPLOYEE STATUS
EVADED POSTLITIGATION?
Yes: Companies
discouraged workers
from filing.
Yes: Company never sat
at the bargaining table
with workers; union
dropped representation.
Yes: Company
restructured itself to
avoid employee
classification of
workers.

CONCLUSION
Taken together, these three case studies from the antecedent gig
economy provide empirical data for both sides of the debate on the role
of litigation in social change. On the one hand, although rights were too
easily dismantled after Tracy, the decision ensured that taxi workers
were not forced to pay cash bonds to the cab companies in San
Francisco for many decades to come. The Ninth Circuit decision in
Friendly Cab created good precedent that undoubtedly influenced how
companies considering use of independent contractor labor structuring
their work. And though FedEx got themselves out from underneath the
holdings of Estrada and Alexander through business restructuring, the
millions of dollars they were forced to pay to drivers constituted some
transfer of wealth. And the publicity around these cases raised public
awareness by revealing the vulnerabilities of these workers.239
On the other hand, these judicial victories were followed by reallife losses for workers. By and large, these cases did not effect what
they set out to accomplish, nor did they spur or support worker
movements more broadly. Because it took time for the outcomes to
unfold, the public was left with the impression that justice had been
239

McCann, supra note 27, at 83–84.
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served, that the system had worked, and that people being cheated out
of livelihoods were righted. It took a few years for FedEx to roll out
their ISP model, and it took a few months for workers to determine that
this ISP structure itself was exploitative. After the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the rights of the EBDA to collectively bargain with Friendly
Cab, months passed before the Teamsters announced that they could not
support the drivers. And of course, Tracy took many years to become
ineffectual.
For social movement scholars, my findings across these case
studies may be intuitive: relying on litigation alone will not affect
security for workers. For advocates fighting for workers’ rights in the
gig economy, however, employee status is understood as the umbrella
under which workers must stand to achieve security. As a result,
litigation to achieve employee status seems like the logical place to pour
resources and energy. What the post-litigation stories of Tracy,
Friendly Cab, and Alexander underscore that for political and structural
reasons, firms can too easily push workers out from under these hardwon protections or deter them from seeking protection at all. Further,
the self-visions and desires of workers do not necessarily align with the
goals of the misclassification litigation. Litigation victories for
employee rights in the gig economy are, thus, by themselves,
ineffective.
Scott Cummings and others have convincingly argued that with
low-wage workers, in order to be successful, litigation must be a “part
of a comprehensive campaign that deploys multiple strategies” to
advance economic justice.240 In all three of these case studies, while
workers’ may have been centered—the litigation was not “politically
integrated,” as Cummings defines it.241 Accordingly, I maintain that for
social change actors—workers, lawyers, organizations, and labor
leaders—considering how to achieve economic justice in the gig
economy, the “opportunities and constraints”242 of misclassification
litigation must be constantly considered. What will the challenges be to
enforcing the litigation outcome, even if the plaintiffs win? What will
be the firm’s structural and political responses to that litigation? How
can worker advocates preempt such responses?
Politically-integrated litigation means ensuring that lawsuits are not
filed without exploring and employing multiple strategies for change
from the outset—including policy, organizing, and media initiatives.
Doug NeJaime, in examining the positive impacts of litigation loss on
240. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 32, at 611.
241. Id. at 616.
242. Scott Cummings and Deborah Rhode make this point in their vanguard
piece on the role of public interest litigation in enacting social change. Id. at 613–15.
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social change (the opposite of what I have done with these case
studies), makes the important point that much of the research and
literature in this debate actually fails to understand legislation and
litigation as integrated parts of a strategy for change.243 However, with
respect to the gig economy—both old and new—litigation has been, by
and large, the only strategy, to the detriment of utilizing other avenues
for social change. In short, these wins in court have precluded both the
building and maintenance of both collective worker power and
legislative action.
Politically-integrated misclassification litigation is much easier
discussed than enacted, especially by dispersed, atomized workers and
decentralized advocates operating across both public and private arenas.
However, as I discussed in this Article, on-demand gig economy firms
have carried out their own form of politically-integrated advocacy—
defending lawsuits, lobbying for new laws to protect their independent
contractor model, and deploying savvy public relations campaigns that
include the mobilization of consumers. Labor, by contrast, has almost
solely relied on lawsuits.
While litigation has taken the center stage in the fight against the
contemporary gig economy, the case studies from the antecedent gig
economy are clear: even if successful, these lawsuits will not make
insecure work secure. After spending twenty years litigating
misclassification cases, Beth Ross, who valiantly led FedEx drivers
through multi-state litigation, through a win in Estrada and Alexander
emphasized, “Litigation is not the answer. It is part of the strategy, but
not the answer.”244
***

243. Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements,
111 MICH. L. REV. 877, 889-90 (2012).
244. Interview with Beth Ross, supra note 30.

